Dr. Seifert: At the age of fourteen, I read some dialogues of Plato and Kant´s Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics that can pretend to be a science (1783). Reading Kant, I thought: On the one hand, his distinction between analytic and synthetic a priori propositions is fantastic and very important. But, on the other hand, I found his position on the subjective origin of the synthetic a priori knowledge and his negation of the knowledge of things in themselves to be an attack on the very core of human knowledge, of Philosophy and of man himself. It seemed impossible to me to retain my philosophical and religious realist world view and to avoid the obvious earth-shaking consequences of Kant’s rejection of philosophical realism as mere dogmatism, without finding an answer to the tremendous challenge posed by the subjective Copernican turn advocated by him. Just at that time I had the good fortune of becoming acquainted with Hildebrand’s and Reinach’s stunning discovery and demonstration of an objective synthetic a priori rooted in the necessary essences of things themselves and in themselves, a necessity wholly different from the one with which Ka

https://www.scielo.org.mx/pdf/rfoi/v5n7/v5n7a15.pdf