The Fred Martinez Report

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Francis/Leo?: C. S. Lewis once observed something that rang very true for me. In his book God in the Dock: Essays on Theology and Ethics, Lewis wrote: Of all tyrannies, a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims may be the most oppressive. It would be better to live under robber barons than under omnipotent moral busybodies. The robber baron’s cruelty may sometimes sleep, his cupidity may at some point be satiated; but those who torment us for our own good will torment us without end for they do so with the approval of their own conscience.

https://www.econlib.org/two-rules-of-thumb-regarding-reformers/ C. S. Lewis once observed something that rang very true for me. In his book God in the Dock: Essays on Theology and Ethics , Lewis wrote: Of all tyrannies, a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims may be the most oppressive. It would be better to live under robber barons than under omnipotent moral busybodies. The robber baron’s cruelty may sometimes sleep, his cupidity may at some point be satiated; but those who torment us for our own good will torment us without end for they do so with the approval of their own conscience.

Ultimately, this dissertation will argue that the Lockean problem underlies a coherent, though problematic, theology of labor in Rerum Novarum. At the root of this theology sits the voluntary alienation of labor under the auspices of remunerative consent. While the sorrow and suffering that accompanies bodily labor derive from the mortal consequences of the Fall, Christ’s freely chosen participation in postlapsarian labor transformed the conditions that burden bodily labor into a cruciform burden. It is this cruciform burden that the laborer carries on the via dolorosa, the way of suffering, that leads from this “vale of tears” to the soteriological horizon of the Crucifixion. At the same time, precisely because Christ freely chose his earthly labor, to participate in Christ’s redemptive suffering and labor requires a voluntary act. Thus, the very consent that alienates one’s labor serves as the voluntary act that renders the sorrow and suffering of bodily labor cruciform. Therefore, inasmuch as Leo’s social teaching assumes Lockean principles and logic, the Lockean problem underlies the theology of labor in Rerum Novarum. From this problem, Leo’s theology of labor represents the sacralization of alienated labor. Committee Vincent Miller (Committee Chair)

https://etd.ohiolink.edu/acprod/odb_etd/etd/r/1501/10?clear=10&p10_accession_num=dayton1670703204969679 2022, Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.), University of Dayton, Theology. Abstract Widely considered the foundational document of modern papal social teaching, Leo XIII’s Rerum Novarum articulates a host of principles that have informed Catholic social teaching and thought through the twentieth century and beyond. Of these principles, one of the most enduring is Leo’s defense of private property as a natural right. Yet, as a host of commentators have pointed out, this defense bears a striking affinity with the property theory of John Locke. Most crucially, Leo seems to assume the Lockean principle that the natural right to property derives from the act of labor. Insofar as Locke is often referred to as the “father” of classical liberalism, it seems that Leo writes one of, if not the, primary tenets of laissez-faire liberalism into papal social teaching at its foundation. R...

Google AI: Rist critiques Leo XIII for redefining the common good into a "social expression of individual rights." Under this modern framework, the common good is no longer a shared end, but merely the aggregate sum of individual protections.

John Rist ’s critique centers on the claim that Pope Leo XIII’s foundational encyclical, Rerum Novarum (1891), fundamentally shifted Catholic political thought by adopting a modern, liberal, and individualized framework of human rights instead of maintaining the classical, Thomistic view of the common good. As a prominent Catholic philosopher and classicist, Rist argues that Leo XIII—by responding to the rise of state socialism and raw industrial capitalism—mistakenly attempted to beat modern secular thinkers at their own game. In doing so, Rist contends that the encyclical began explicitly defining social structures as a mechanism to protect individual rights under the banner of strict justice rather than theological charity . [ 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 ] The Core Mechanisms of Rist's Critique 1. The Privatization of Justice over Charity [ 1 ] Rist claims that Leo XIII created a problematic boundary between justice and charity. In Rerum Novarum , the Pope famously argued that while the stat...

Google AI on Manet's Critique of Pope Leo XIV and Modernized "Common Good"Manent’s perspective offers a direct critique of the philosophical shifts seen in modern institutions, including the Vatican under Pope Leo XIV (specifically his 2026 encyclical Magnifica Humanitas).[Traditional Common Good] ──► Aimed at objective moral ends & collective flourishing [Modernized Common Good] ──► Reduced to the "social expression of individual dignity" Manent objects to redefining the common good as merely the social manifestation of individual dignity for several distinct reasons:The Threat of Hyper-Individualism: When the common good is defined solely as a mechanism to protect or express personal dignity, the "community" ceases to have its own natural, intrinsic value. It turns society into an artificial landscape designed merely to validate individual preferences.The Erosion of Political Subsidiarity: Manent warns that when global or religious authorities replace concrete political forms (like the nation-state) with blanket abstractions about "humanity" and "global dignity," they erode true citizenship.The Emptying of "Man": In alignment with his previous works like The City of Man, Manent claims that decoupling law from objective human nature "de-substantializes" human beings. It forces the law to protect absolute self-creation, which ultimately leaves no shared criteria to distinguish between virtuous actions and arbitrary whims.Ultimately, Pierre Manent insists that we cannot formulate genuine moral duties from an imagined state of total independence. True human dignity is not preserved by shielding the individual will from nature, but by anchoring human freedom within a shared, natural order.

In his recent essay " Why Natural Law? A direction for man that does not hinder his free will " (published in the Claremont Review of Books ), the French political philosopher Pierre Manent argues that natural law provides an objective framework of guidance that guides—rather than restricts—human freedom and deliberate action. [ 1 , 2 ] Manent stands as a prominent critic of modern individualistic rights-discourse, which includes critiques of recent institutional developments like Pope Leo XIV's encyclical Magnifica Humanitas . He challenges the tendency to reduce the "common good" into a mere "social expression of individual dignity," arguing that such definitions hollow out actual political life and objective moral truths. [ 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 ] Core Concept: Natural Law vs. Individual Will Manent’s exploration of natural law addresses a fundamental modern paradox: contemporary society views "natural law" as an authoritarian check on per...

Manet: In this way, we have been led to see migratory movements as the most significant phenomenon of the present world. As the concrete embodiment of the movement toward a unified humanity, migrants appear as the witnesses and agents of the work of justice par excellence. They represent the movement from the particular to the general, or to the “universal,” as we now prefer to say. Migrants are not a particular population which, confronted with a certain situation, responds to it in a certain way. Migrations are not a political and social phenomenon among other political and social phenomena that we must address. Rather, migrations are thought to be the carriers of the new justice, and migrants, as a distinct human group, symbolize in our eyes the union of force and justice, a privilege that had always been reserved to self-governing peoples organized politically into communities of citizens. The phenomenon that I have just briefly described makes no sense unless it is linked with the idea that is the leitmotif of my argument, the idea of justice that sees its principle entirely in the self-relation of the individual human being. This idea has recently taken on a particular virulence, since it is no longer either tempered or counterbalanced by any principle of association, or any articulation of the civic common good. If there is no justice but that of the general, of humanity in general, that is, of the individual set in his unassailable self-relation, then the individual who presents himself at the border, or who crosses the border, in the name of his humanity understood as indistinguishable from that of any other, and who thus represents all of humanity—this individual is the carrier of a right that can prevail in opposition to the will of any political body. The political body then appears as a mere particular association, one ultimately lacking moral legitimacy. The puny individual, who in many cases has already crossed so many borders, is seen to represent humanity in toto, while the political body, within the borders it claims to defend, is only a circumscription of humanity, a fraction that separates itself—particularly if it refuses access to the human being who presents himself in the name of human rights. It is not too difficult to understand the logic of the argument, or how it is that the legitimacy of the general has moved from the democratic political body—from the general will or the common good—to the individual qua individual, as simply a member of humanity in general. But logic is one thing, and politics another thing altogether. What is hard to understand is how and why democratic nations, which for two or three centuries had made such great strides toward the “best regime,” the representative regime in the framework of the nation—and which had derived such pride from this effort—emptied themselves so abruptly of their sense of self and their confidence in their legitimate rights, to the point of seeing in the self-regard of the political community a kind of crime against humanity.

In this way, we have been led to see migratory movements as the most significant phenomenon of the present world. As the concrete embodiment of the movement toward a unified humanity, migrants appear as the witnesses and agents of the work of justice par excellence. They represent the movement from the particular to the general, or to the “universal,” as we now prefer to say. Migrants are not a particular population which, confronted with a certain situation, responds to it in a certain way. Migrations are not a political and social phenomenon among other political and social phenomena that we must address. Rather, migrations are thought to be the carriers of the new justice, and migrants, as a distinct human group, symbolize in our eyes the union of force and justice, a privilege that had always been reserved to self-governing peoples organized politically into communities of citizens. The phenomenon that I have just briefly described makes no sense unless it is linked with the idea t...