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On the Difference Between Social Justice and Christian Charity [Leo & Martian misuse according to Rist?]

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/272879650_On_the_Difference_Between_Social_Justice_and_Christian_Charity
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Villey wanted to convey a message. We should realise, he argued, that the new conception of rights was the first step on the downhill road to modernity, individualism, egoism, and neglect of social solidarity and the common good, away from the superior conception of an overall objective and just order which was given a classical statement by Thomas Aquinas (Villey 1969, 141). The mediaeval Aristotelian synthesis of Aquinas had been the high point of philosophy, from which later scholastics such as Duns Scotus and Ockham had fallen away. The path of modern philosophy had been further downward. Hobbes, Spinoza, Gassendi, Locke, Wolff were among those who contributed to the déformation. Villey did not agree that, as asserted e.g. by Jacques Maritain (1961, 84), it was Grotius who began deforming the genuine idea of natural law. The decline had begun earlier.25 A sketch as brief as this cannot do full justice to Villey’s account of rights-concepts and their history. Insightful expositions and criticisms are made in writings by Brian Tierney from the 1980s onward (Tierney 1997). They are a rich source of information about mediaeval thought and contain significant objections to many of Villey’s theses (Tierney 1997, 13). He shows that concepts claimed to have originated with Ockham were current much earlier

https://openresearch-repository.anu.edu.au/server/api/core/bitstreams/e8a3222c-2bdc-4bcf-900c-f161372e7273/content

In defence of Michel Villey By John Lamont

https://www.academia.edu/2520149/In_defence_of_Michel_Villey (PDF) In defence of Michel Villey Academia.edu https://www.academia.edu  › In_defence_of_Michel_Vil... In defence of   Michel   Villey . Profile image of   John Lamont John Lamont . visibility … description. 11 pages. descriptionSee full PDF downloadDownload PDF.

Two essays stand out, at least to this reviewer. John Lamont’s contribution, a defence of the work of Michel Villey on objective right, perhaps deserves special mention for making Villey, who remains largely untranslated, much more accessible to the English world. Not only does Lamont offer an impressive summary of Villey’s views on objective rights, he also seriously challenges the dismissal of Villey by most English speaking scholars. This defence, like Villey’s work, occurs along both historical and philosophical axes. Villey’s case, as he presents it, is trenchant: that objective rights exist, whereas subjective rights do not, and that the organisation of much of the modern world around subjective rights is damaging. This seems to me an extremely important discussion for legal and political theory (although it neglects to mention Hegel’s notion of objective rights

https://researchonline.nd.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1032&context=solidarity

Finnis notes, in the work of Suárez, the primary meaning of jus comes to be a moral power that a person has over what belongs to him or is due to him.17 Finnis, however, disagrees with theorists such as Michel Villey that this watershed represents a bad development that needs to be corrected.

The So-Called “New Natural Law Theory” The Josias https://thejosias.com  › 2024/04/30 › the-so-called-new-... Apr 30, 2024 —  The  So - Called  “ New Natural Law Theory ”. A  Spanish version  of this  paper appears  in:  Miguel Ayuso Torres  ( ed .), ¿ El derecho natural contra el  ...

Villey on 1600-to now: justice of the modern concerns the subjective intentions of individuals rather than their external activity. Kant places at the peak of his justice, amongst other very general maxims, the obligation to respect the grandeur of the human person and its moral liberty which is presupposed in others just as we feel it within ourselves. And this principle of the respect due to the human person has become the leitmotiv, and the sum of justice. As modern doctrine tended towards this result since the beginning of the seventeenth century, we have turned justice into that virtue which respects other persons, their dignity, their liberty, their 'rights'. Now Cf my article 'Kant dans 1' histoire du droit' in La Philosophie politique de Kant, PU 1961, p 49. As well as to the revival of stoicism (right at the beginning of the modern era) about which similar observations may be made. Cf my article: 'Deux conceptions du droit nature1 dans I'AntiquitC', in Le~ons d' histoire de In philosophie du droit. Cf my study: 'Quatre ouvrages sur la justice', APD. 1960, p 215. VILLEY (TRANS VOILLEY): EPITOME OF CLASSICAL NATURAL LAW 8 1 such formulae may help to orient a set of morals (or what we today call so) but in spite of the frequent use many of my colleagues make of them, they leave jurists starving. I wish nothing more dearly than to respect the human person; but it does not seem to me to constitute a program for juridical studies. We might just as well try to solve a juridical problem with the principle of the respect due to the human person as try to calculate the age of the captain on the basis of the dimensions of the vessel. I am perfectly willing to respect the right of others, but where does this right end, what is its precise consistence? Is it to be infinite (as its beneficiaries gladly imagine) as in, for example, these 'rights of man' to 'health'

https://classic.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/GriffLawRw/2000/5.pdf  

Villey: The doctrine of natural law escapes the first two reproaches levelled I against subjectivism: sterility and arbitrariness. To start from the observation of nature, to draw from objective sources, is the only procedure capable of giving us no longer a formal set of morals, but one loaded with content; capable of equipping us with rules of conduct; capable of teaching us objectively which acts are good and which acts are sins, such as that suicide is a fault, or temperance a virtue,

https://classic.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/GriffLawRw/2000/5.pdf  

Villey: Nature as the Source of the Just Let us then have the humility to ask classical philosophy again about the sources of the just. First a preliminary remark: the texts of Aristotle and Aquinas on which I have so far commented, have taught us nothing yet on this question; they concerned exclusively the object of justice, not its sources. We still do not know whether there is a natural just. To say that justice means to 'allocate to each his right' informs us neither about the content nor about the means which we could have to determine the right of each; it merely indicates its form in a Kantian sense. To say that the just is to be analysed as a certain proportion does not tell me which it is. I know that it is just to pay the just price to my seller, that is to say a sum equal to the value of the merchandise, but it is still necessary to estimate this value. I know that the honours and public offices will be justly distributed if a certain correspondence is respected as regards the persons of the citizens; but I still do not know which sort of correspondence. Aristotle warns us that the solutions would be different under a democratic regime (where the number of votes counts) from those under an aristocratic regime where these solutions are calculated according to virtue, wealth, or capacities. Choosing between these two criteria, which will lead to opposite results, is not his concern at this stage. Modern readers, anxious to obtain an answer which serves their passions, be these liberal or socialist, hurry to read a solution where the text refrained from premature conclusions: of the cuique suum tribuere they make a justification of liberal property - a program for social reforms out of the just price; or of distributive justice - a choice in favour of aristocracy. There is nothing

https://classic.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/GriffLawRw/2000/5.pdf  

Sony Thăng @nxt888 People think propaganda is about convincing you. It is not. Propaganda is about exhausting you until you no longer resist the frame. Once you accept their definitions, Your conclusions become predictable, Your emotions become programmable, And your consent becomes Show more Brother Hawkins @BrotherHawkins

Sony Thăng @nxt888 · 19h People think propaganda is about convincing you. It is not. Propaganda is about exhausting you until you no longer resist the frame. Once you accept their definitions, Your conclusions become predictable, Your emotions become programmable, And your consent becomes Show more Brother Hawkins @BrotherHawkins 9:27 AM · Dec 5, 2025 · 1,384 Views