Skip to main content

Posts

Let us examine how Ernest Fortin critiques this specific development, as his critique of human rights hits at the very heart of the Locke-Rousseau-Kant transition. Fortin argues that the shift from Locke’s "natural property rights" to Kant’s "universal moral autonomy" represents a massive, unstable experiment in Western thought. By trying to fix the moral emptiness of Locke's system with Kant's historical idealism, modernity created a concept of "Human Rights" that is fundamentally detached from both nature and objective goodness. Fortin’s critique of this specific development unfolds across three major points: 1. The Lowly Origins: Locke's "Rights" as Self-Preservation Fortin reminds us that the modern concept of "rights" did not begin with lofty moral ideals. It began with Hobbes and Locke lowering the standards of classical-Christian natural law. • The Classical View: Natural law imposed duties on human beings to pursue virtue and the common good. • The Lockean Shift: Locke inverted this, making individual rights prior to duties. These rights were grounded in the low but reliable passions of self-preservation, physical security, and property ownership. • Fortin's Critique: Fortin points out that Locke’s rights are essentially selfish. They are claims the individual makes against society and others to protect their own private sphere. It is a rights-framework designed for the bourgeois. 2. The Rousseauian Crisis and the Kantian "Inflation" of Rights As we established, Rousseau was disgusted by Locke's selfish bourgeois society and demanded a return to virtue. Kant tried to fulfill this by upgrading Lockean rights into something noble: universal moral autonomy. Kant argued that a human right is not just a claim to protect your property; it is a sacred claim to be an autonomous, self-legislating moral agent. Fortin argues that this transition created a dangerous "inflation" of rights: • To rescue rights from Locke's vulgar materialism, Kant had to completely detach rights from human biology and physical nature. He grounded them purely in the abstract "will." • The Consequence: By defining freedom as absolute autonomy (literally, "self-legislating"), Kant implied that human beings are only truly free when they are completely independent of any external authority—including nature, tradition, or God. 3. The Modern Dilemma: Rights Without Duties Fortin’s most profound critique of the Locke-Kant transition is that it leaves modern society completely unequipped to foster genuine community. Because modern rights were born out of Locke's individualism and then hyper-charged by Kant's radical autonomy, they lack any intrinsic connection to objective human goodness or shared moral obligations. • In the Augustinian framework, human freedom is meaningful only when it is directed toward the Truth and the Good (loving God and neighbor). • In the modern Kantian framework, the absolute right to choose becomes more important than what is chosen. Fortin notes the tragic irony: modernity started by trusting Locke's commercial self-interest to build a stable state, realized it was morally bankrupt, and then used Kant's philosophy of history to promise that radical individual autonomy would somehow automatically produce a just, harmonious world. Instead, Fortin argues, it has left us with a hyper-legalistic society of atomized individuals weaponizing their "rights" against one another, completely lacking the shared virtues required to sustain a civilization.

Let us examine how Ernest Fortin critiques this specific development , as his critique of human rights hits at the very heart of the Locke-Rousseau-Kant transition. Fortin argues that the shift from Locke’s "natural property rights" to Kant’s "universal moral autonomy" represents a massive, unstable experiment in Western thought. By trying to fix the moral emptiness of Locke's system with Kant's historical idealism, modernity created a concept of "Human Rights" that is fundamentally detached from both nature and objective goodness. Fortin’s critique of this specific development unfolds across three major points: 1. The Lowly Origins: Locke's "Rights" as Self-Preservation Fortin reminds us that the modern concept of "rights" did not begin with lofty moral ideals. It began with Hobbes and Locke lowering the standards of classical-Christian natural law . The Classical View: Natural law imposed duties on human beings to pursue ...
Recent posts

Classical Christianity and the Political Order: Reflections on the Theologico-Political Problem 0847682773, 9780847682775 In Volume Two of Ernest Fortin: Collected Essays, Fortin deals with the relationship between religion and civil society

https://dokumen.pub/classical-christianity-and-the-political-order-reflections-on-the-theologico-political-problem-0847682773-9780847682775.html Classical Christianity and the Political Order: Reflections on the Theologico-Political Problem 0847682773, 9780847682775 In Volume Two of Ernest Fortin: Collected Essays, Fortin deals with the relationship between religion and civil society 1,895 65 18MB English Pages xvi+404 [428] Year 1996 Report DMCA / Copyright DOWNLOAD FILE Polecaj historie Classical Christianity and the Political Order: Reflections on the Theologico-Political Problem 0847682765, 9780847682768 In Volume Two of Ernest Fortin: Collected Essays, Fortin deals with the relationship between religion and civil society 630 124 2MB Read more Reflections on the Political Situation in India There are times when silence is as criminal as indiscreet speaking at other times. In my judgement the time has come whe 811 82 3MB Read more Kierkegaardian Reflections on the Problem ...