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A Theory of the Origin of ["subjective"] Rights-Concepts Among those who in the post-war period devoted themselves to a study of the history of moral and political thought, Michel Villey came to play quite a significant part (see Villey 1964, 1968, 1969 and many other writings). He maintained—rightly—that the historiography of rightsconcepts had to look back beyond Grotius. A central thesis of his was that the modern concept of a right had its origin in the writings of William of Ockham, and that it was shaped in the course of the polemic against Pope John XXII that began in 1321, on the question of evangelical poverty.23 The Franciscan position, defended by Ockham, was that having taken a vow of poverty, they had no property and nothing was their own. They made use of basic necessities (food, raiment, shelter) but they did not own anything. It was, according to Villey, in this context that the concept of property rights and other real rights came to be defined. As the possessor of a right in this sense the person is in control and decides what is lawful and unlawful, right and wrong. The characterisation of the conception of a droit subjectif that Villey spells out in some detail is rather similar to Stahl’s, quoted above.24

How Rights Became “Subjective” The Australian National University https://openresearch-repository.anu.edu.au › content PDF by T MAUTNER · 2013 · Cited by 17 — It emerged in certain recent scholarly investigations of the rights -concepts used by mediaeval and early-modern authors such as Aquinas, Ockham, Gerson, Suárez , ... Missing: legislator ‎| Show results with: legislator

Contrary to Lamont's rejection of (purportedly) Suarez's understanding of a right as a subjective moral power, I show that it is understood in relation to the natural moral law, an objective order of justice, which is precisely what Lamont advocates for when he tries to make sense of the way one can accept the Church's understanding of rights. There is perhaps confusion over the notion of "subjective," which Lamont seems to think is a monadic property of an individual, and as a result rights are expressed "in human law just as they are, without needing significant interpretation." Id. at 213. He goes on to equate this understanding of a subjective natural right with Hobbes and Locke. This notion of a subjective natural right is not Suarez's, and it is this connection from Suarez to these modern thinkers - and now, our contemporary state of affairs - that I am contesting. However, it needs to be noted that I am not addressing Lamont's arguments about the specific understanding of natural law and conscience which Suarez had; rather, I am taking a more general approach to show the compatibility of natural rights and natural law, regardless of how Suarez may have understood natural law in relation to practical reason and the Divine will and conscience. Suarez still considered the natural law to obtain with respect to right moral action. In short, subjective natural rights do not have to be grounded in a Hobbesian or Lockean anthropology. Contra, e.g., Kries, supra note 2, at 412. 9 See Tierney, supra note 2, at 343-44. At the very least, Tierney does not clearly and elaborately explain some important differences between pre-modern and contemporary rights.

the foundation of human rights: catholic contributions, part i ... Ave Maria School of Law https://www.avemarialaw.edu › 2024/07 › Brust PDF I will show that Suarez provides an understanding of and justification for a natural right as a moral power or faculty pertaining to the individual subject ... Contra Lamont, supra note 3, at 179-81. Contrary to Lamont's rejection of (purportedly) Suarez's understanding of a right as a subjective moral power, I show that it is understood in relation to the natural moral law, an objective order of justice, which is precisely what Lamont advocates for when he tries to make sense of the way one can accept the Church's understanding of rights. There is perhaps confusion over the notion of "subjective," which Lamont seems to think is a monadic property of an individual, and as a result rights are expressed "in human law just as they are, without needing significant interpretation." Id. at 213. He goes on to...

Customary Law in Suárez: Will of the Sovereign or of the ... Oxford Academic https://academic.oup.com › book › chapter Aquinas sees law as expressing the objective rational and moral order of human life while Suárez sees law as expressing the subjective orders of the legislator.

Customary Law in Suárez: Will of the Sovereign or of the ... Oxford Academic https://academic.oup.com › book › chapter Aquinas sees law as expressing the objective rational and moral order of human life while Suárez sees law as expressing the subjective orders of the legislator . Rights, Political Community, and Property in Francisco Suárez’s and John Locke’s Theories of the State of Nature José Luis Cendejas Bueno 1 Introduction This chapter provides a comparative analysis of the relationship between natu - ral law, subjective rights, political community, and property in Francisco Su á rez (1548–1617) ( De legibus [On laws (1612)]; De opere sex dierum [On the work of six days (1621)]) and John Locke (1632–1704) ( Second Treatise of Government [1690]). 1 The high degree of congruence between these two authors precludes any negation of Su á rez’s influence on Locke. Apart from the theory of prop - erty, scholars have found other influences with regard to notions of l...