Google AI on "liberty of indifference medieval teachers": Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225–1274) Position: Intellectualist, arguing for "freedom for excellence." vs.Core idea: Scotus argued for the will's complete independence from the intellect's judgments. For Scotus, the will is a self-determining power that can choose or reject any course of action presented to it, no matter how good or rational it appears.
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In medieval scholasticism, the concept of "liberty of indifference" (liberum arbitrium indifferentiae) describes the will's capacity to choose between different, equally appealing alternatives, unconstrained by external causes or even the intellect
. This idea was central to the voluntarist movement, which emphasized the will's power and independence, in contrast to the intellectualist view, which saw the will as determined by the intellect's judgment of the good. Voluntarists versus intellectualists
This debate on the will's nature is a key feature of medieval thought, with two main schools of thought:
- Voluntarists: Figures like John Duns Scotus and William of Ockham championed the liberty of indifference. They argued that genuine freedom means the will has the inexplicable power to choose between opposing options, even against the strongest reasons presented by the intellect. This makes the will a self-determining power, or causa sui.
- Intellectualists: Philosophers such as Thomas Aquinas argued against this concept. They maintained that the will is naturally drawn to the good presented by the intellect. In this view, freedom comes not from indifference, but from the ability to act according to one's rational nature, a concept known as "freedom for excellence".
Key medieval teachers and their positions
John Duns Scotus (c. 1266–1308)
- Position: Staunchly voluntarist and libertarian.
- Core idea: Scotus argued for the will's complete independence from the intellect's judgments. For Scotus, the will is a self-determining power that can choose or reject any course of action presented to it, no matter how good or rational it appears.
- Reason: This is what grounds human responsibility. The freedom to act contrary to reason is a necessary condition for true moral accountability.
William of Ockham (c. 1287–1347)
- Position: Embraced an even more radical version of voluntarism than Scotus.
- Core idea: According to Ockham, a morally responsible agent must possess the "liberty of indifference," the power to choose freely between opposites. This means the will can either act or not act, and can even will the contrary, regardless of the reasons presented by the intellect.
- Influence: Ockham's extreme voluntarism had a significant influence on later medieval thought and helped shape the modern notion of free will.
Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225–1274)
- Position: Intellectualist, arguing for "freedom for excellence."
- Core idea: For Aquinas, the will is an appetite of the rational soul. It is not indifferent but is naturally drawn toward what the intellect perceives as good. Freedom, then, is the ability to choose among different paths to achieve that good, rather than being forced by external factors.
- Contrast with voluntarists: Unlike the voluntarists, Aquinas did not believe that true freedom meant the ability to choose evil for its own sake. The will's natural end is the good, and freedom is perfected by pursuing it.
The consequences of the debate
The opposing views of the voluntarists and intellectualists had a profound impact on later philosophical and theological thought:
- Moral and theological implications: The voluntarist defense of indifference was intended to preserve human moral responsibility and God's absolute freedom. It ensured that humans could be praised or blamed for their actions because they truly could have acted otherwise.
- Early modern philosophy: The scholastic terms "liberty of spontaneity" (unconstrained action) and "liberty of indifference" (uncaused choice) were later adopted and re-examined by philosophers like David Hume. Hume defined liberty of indifference as a "negation of necessity and causes," a concept he argued was not the basis for moral responsibility.
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