Skip to main content


Under the Editorship of 

Edward McChesney Sait 



Luther to Hitler 


William Montgomery McGovern 





Vbe &itoetr<ibc HftHM 




William Yandell Elliott 


Ralph W. E. Reid 

Editor’s Introduction 

Ideas, as well as men, may have a life that is worth telling about. 
Professor McGovern gives us here a unique biographical study. Through 
a period of four centuries he has traced the growth of certain doctrines 
which, according to official apologists, provide a foundation for the 
Fascist and Nazi regimes. Such a biography of ideas possesses great 
value as showing persistent continuity, in spite of all lapses and modi- 
fications; it also makes a more dramatic appeal because of its bearing 
upon the political phenomena of today. 

The relation between philosophical doctrines and human conduct 
will, of course, always be debatable. Does theory determine practice, 
or does practice determine theory? Has some pre-existing theory been 
seized upon to justify a course of action and then erroneously assumed 
to be the reason for such action — post hoc, ergo propter hoc? Whatever 
view we take. Doctor McGovern’s contribution has great significance. 
It is significant, first of all, because Fascists and Nazis alike profess to 
.have a philosophical basis for their political systems; and, secondly, 
because the fate of democracy elsewhere may be involved. Not long 
ago men spoke of democracy as permanent and as destined to encompass 
the whole world. Its onward march was “irresistible”; to discuss the 
comparative merits of other forms of government would be a waste of 
time; once having acquired control, the people would never relinquish it. 
This was the language commonly employed twenty years ago and even 
more recently. Then' came the shock — the recurrence of despotism, 
the establishment of the so-called dictatorships. Whether or not the 
explanation of this debdcle lies in the domain of theory, what Professor 
McGovern tells us about the Italian and .German ideologies and their 
genetic background has wider implications. Democracy appears to be 
on the defensive; and, in combating the enemy, it should know some- 
thing about the philosophical weapons that are being used against it. 

In addition to its timeliness, this book has several other claims to dis- 
tinction. Professor McGovern has the gift of making obscure and recon- 
dite philosophers, like Hegel and Green, comprehensible to the layman; 
and his scholarly equipment will save him from the accusation of being 
clear at the expense of accuracy. He does not write with the pedantry 
that so often afflicts the academic mind when it enters the region of 
philosophy. His exposition is never labored or abstrusb. Instead of con- 

viii editor’s introduction 

tenting himself with dull abstracts and sticking them away in appropri- 
ate pigeonholes, he constantly illuminates one point of view by means of 
contrast with or analogy to another. By this method the reader is 
enabled to get hold of nice shades and fine distinctions. He cannot but 
feel grateful to an expositor who, being an expert, can shed so clear a 
light on murky places. 

Doctor McGovern is a man of varied accomplishments. In. some 
quarters he may be best known as an anthropologist and explorer. His 
interest in these fields would be suggested by the content of his numerous 
books and by the legend of the shako and worm-eaten sheepskin coat 
(tailored in Tibet) which he is supposed to wear when the snow flies in 
Chicago. But he has not turned from anthropology for the moment to 
dabble as an amateur in political thought. He ranks as an authority in 
this field. He studied philosophy at Oxford (Ph.D., 1922), Berlin, and 
the Sorbonne; and he teaches political theory at Northwestern regularly, 
sometimes at Harvard. It is his familiarity with the philosophers that 
enables him to deal with them so freely and cogently. 

There is unity in the theme. We encounter a succession of philos- 
ophers from the Reformation down. But the materials are not hetero- 
geneous, not a mere potpourri of disconnected doctrines. The author is* 
laying before us the development of certain ideas that do form parts of a 
common design. Far from confusing us in a maze of incongruous subtle- 
ties, he is making plain some aspects of current practical politics. Never- 
theless, he has not confined himself narrowly to the specific theme — 
the background of Fascist and Nazi ideologies. Strict adherence to the 
straight line would have made the book less useful and less interesting. 
About any theorist the student will be curious to know something be- 
sides his attitude toward authoritarianism and toward what Doctor 
McGovern calls etatism (the subordination of the individual to the 
state). A tendency to include other phases of thought that are not alto- 
gether apposite to the main purpose gives the book additional value; 
for it is advisable to present the contribution of each theorist as a whole, 
without distorting it by overemphasis upon a single point. But what of 
the liberals, the opponents of authoritarianism and etatism? They have 
not been ignored. John Locke, for example, looms large in this discus- 
sion; for, in the growth of the absolutist tradition, his powerful argu- 
ments against it could not be ignored. 

Professor McGovern's text does not follow the conventional pattern. 
He covers a long period, but concentrates upon tracing one stream of 
thought to its culmination in the political systems of Mussolini and 



Hitler. He describes the course of the stream mainly in his own lan- 
guage, but he adds vividness by giving many excerpts from the original 
sources, as an' explorer in central Africa or the basin of the Amazon 
would have recourse to maps and photographs. The book is admirably 
suited to form the basis of a half-year course either in philosophy or in 
government; and, because it is so intimately related to contemporary 
problems, both teachers and students will be glad to use it as a substi- 
tute for traditional courses. Indeed, its appeal extends beyond college 
gates. At the present time eyes are focused upon Rome and Berlin, 
curious to discover what lies behind the vagaries of the Axis powers. 
Professor McGovern himself has such clear vision that he makes others 
see what would escape their attention otherwise. . The general reader, 
the man who has never opened a philosophical treatise or heard a lecture 
on philosophy, will find this book much to ]iis taste; for so lucidly are the 
thinkers interpreted that it can be understood easily without any previ- 
ous training. 

Edward McChesney Sait 


In writing and in revising this book I have been greatly aided by the 
advice and assistance of many persons. I owe an especial debt of grati- 
tude to the following persons: Professor E. M. Sait of Pomona College; 
Professors A. R. Hatton, K. W. Colegrove, E. Schaub, D. T. Howard, 
and H. Simon of Northwestern University; Professors A. N. Holcombe, 
H. Bruening, C. H. Mcllwain, and Crane Brinton, and Doctor George 
Pettee of Harvard University. Each of these persons has read through 
one or more sections of the book. I am also deeply grateful to Mr. H. 
G. Sonthoff for many valuable suggestions and for his work in preparing 
the index. I have profited greatly by the criticisms made by these and 
other persons; it should be noted, however, that I alone am responsible 
for the opinions expressed. 

William M. McGovern 

Cambridge, Massachusetts 



I . The Liberal and the Fascist Traditions . . . • . 3 

A Study in Contrasts* 


II. The Effect of the Reformation upon Political Philosophy ii 
Th$ Legacy of the Middle Ages* The Results of the Reformation* 
Martin Luther. Henry VIII and the Anglican Church. Gallicanism. 
Grotius and the Rise of International Law* 

in. The Defense of Absolute Monarchy 49 

The Divine Right of Kings (Belloy^ Barclay^ James I, Filmer')* Jean 
Bodin. Thomis Hobbes. 

IV. The Decay of Absolutism 80 

The Rise of Liberalism QLocke, Montesquieu^ Rousseau^ The Conserva- 
tive Reaction in Eut^: Joseph de Maistre. The Conservative Reaction 

in England: Edmund Burke. The Conservative Reaction in America: the 


V. Immanuel Kant and His English Disciples .... 119 
Immanuel Kant* T* H*' Green. Thomas Carlyle* 

VI. The Political Philosophy of Johann Gottlieb Fichte . 109 
Fichte's Life and Times. Fichte's General Philosophy* The Etatisni 

of Fichte* The Authoritarianism of Fichte. 

Vn. The Political Philosophy of G. F. W. Hegel . . • 2159 

Hegel's Life and Times* Hegel's General Philosophy* The Etatism of 
tiegel* The Authoritarianism of Hegel. ^ 




VIII. Traditionalism and the Traditionalists . . *343 

Joseph Heinrich von Trettschke, The Historical School of 

Jurisprudence (Savigny, Puchta^ Marne, Carter'). 

IX. Irrationalism and the Irrationalists 400 

Irrationalism in General Philosophy (James, Bergson, Niets^sche), 
Irrationalism and Social Psychology in England and America (Wallas, 
McDougalf). Irrationalism and Social Psychology in Prance and Italy 
(Tarde, Durkheim, Le Bon, Sorel, Pareto). 

X. The Social Darwinists and Their Allies . . . -453 

The General Implications of Social Darwinism (Spencer, Bagehot, 
GumplowicsJ. Eugenics and the Doctrine of Class Superiority (Galt on, 
Pearson, Stoddard). The Doctrine of Kacial Superiority (Gohineau, H. S. 
Chamberlain, H. Gunther). 


XI. The Political Philosophy OF Fascism 531' 

Mussolini and the Rise of Fascism. The Ideological Background (Social 
Darwinism, Irrationalism, Traditionalism, Idealism). Fascism and 
Etatism. Fascism and Authoritarianism. Fascism and the Corporate 

XII. The Political Philosophy of National Socialism . . 596 

Hitler and the Rise of the Na^i Party. The Ideological Background 
(Traditionalism, Idealism, Irrationalism, Social Darwinism). The 
Nazis and Etatism. The Nazis and Authoritarianism. 







The Liberal and the Fascist Traditions 
A Study in Contrasts 

To THE average Englishman, Frenchman, or American who was alive 
and interested in politics about the year 1912 the world seemed com- 
paratively simple. He was not only convinced that such things as 
democracy, majority rule, and representative government were excellent 
institutions; he was also firm in the belief that sooner or later these 
institutions were bound to prevail all over the world. 

Such a person was aware that such things as dictatorship, despotism, 
or even absolute monarchy continued to prevail in '‘backward coun- 
tries,” but it seemed clear that it was only a matter of time and of in- 
creasing civilization for these “relics of the dark ages” to be swept 
away. The tendency towards democracy and all the things which go 
with democracy was held to be inevitable. It was believed that Eng- 
land, France, and i^^merica were the most democratic merely because 
they were the most advanced countries. It was thought that such 
countries as Germany or Japan were politically somewhat retarded, but 
even in these regions there were strong democratic movements, and 
experts were willing to prophesy that within a few years the vestiges of 
despotic power which still prevailed would disappear. 

Elsewhere, in the very homelands of conservatism and of autocracy 
there seemed to be portents of a better day. Jn 1905 the Russian Czar 
had been forced to grant his subjects a popularly elected Duma. In 
1906 a revolution forced the Shah of Persia to bestow upon the Persians 
a written constitution, a document which curbed many of his former 
absolute powers. In 1908 a similar revolution took place in Turkey as a 
result of which effective rulership was transferred from the Sultan to the 
Committee of Union and Progress, which was regarded as the agent of 
the Turkish people. It was generally admitted that many of the so- 
called republics in Latin America were merely veiled dictatorships, but 
even in this area there seemed to be portents that the dawn of true 
democracy was not far away. The Mexican Revolution of 1910 and the 
subsequent overthrow of the Dictator Diaz were widely hailed as the 



first step in the Spanish -American march towards political liberalism. 
In 1911 the age-old monarchy in China was overthrown, and in its place 
there was established a republic modeled, on paper, after the most ap- 
proved European and American patterns. The Englishmen, French- 
men, and Americans of that generation read about these events in their 
newspapers and smiled approvingly and hopefully. Surely if Persia and 
Turkey and China were going democratic there was no final hope for 
despotism in any corner of the world. 

The World War of 1914-1918 came as a great shock to many persons 
who had looked forward to the peaceful progress and spread of demo- 
cratic ideals, but before long most Englishmen and Frenchmen came to 
look upon this conflict as a sort of necessary crusade of the forward- 
looking democratic powers against the backward-looking despotic pow- 
ers. Even in America the war came to be regarded, not as a mere battle 
between England or France and Germany, but as a battle between de- 
mocracy, liberalism, and freedom on the one side, and absolutism, 
tyranny, and divine right of kings on the other. It was largely because 
of this belief that America eventually entered the war herself. Was it 
not her duty, as a democratic power, to aid in “Making the World Safe 
for Democracy”? It was widely felt that if the “Kaiserism” of Ger- 
many were once overthrown, there would be and could be no further 
barriers to the peaceful and world-wide development of democratic insti- 
tutions to the end of time. 

How charming and attractive were all these beliefs and hopes and 
aspirations — and yet how childish do they appear in the light of subse- 
quent events. The democratic powers after much tribulation were 
indeed triumphant in battle. Not only was Germany defeated, but the 
German monarchy with its autocratic traditions was overthrown, and a 
democratically organized^ republic took its place. The era of despotism 
appeared to be over and yet — the millennium of liberalism failed to 
arrive. Even before the war was over, the Czarist regime in Russia was 
overthrown, but in its place, after a few months of turmoil, there arose, 
not a liberal republic for which so many democratically inclined persons 
had hoped, but a new type of dictatorship, a dictatorship of the proletar- 
iate in theory, a dictatorship of a small group of radical politicians in 
fact. In 1922 liberalism received another blow. Italy had for many 
decades most of the advantages and all the disadvantages of representa- 
tive and parliamentary government. But in the economic and political 
chaos which followed the World War the machinery of government 
practically collapsed, and with surprisingly little effort Mussolini was 



able to impose the Fascist type of dictatorship upon the Italian kingdom. 

Not long afterwards a tendency towards dictatorial rule appeared in 
a number of other countries. In Turkey the ancient Sultanate was, to 
be sure, overthrown, but in its place there arose the strong one-man rule 
of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk who, under the title of President, exercised as 
rigid and autocratic control as any of the Khalifs in former times. In 
1925 a similar transformation took place in Persia. The old dynasty 
was deposed, but its place was taken by a new dynasty, and the new 
Shah, Riza Pahlavi, has as absolute power over his Iranian subjects as 
has Mussolini over the Italians. In China the attempt to establish a 
republic along American lines failed miserably, and in the period 1926- 
1928 supreme power over the Chinese state fell into the hands of a single 
political party, the Kuomintang, and more especially into the hands of 
one or two men, such as Chiang Kai-shek, who controlled this party. 
In 1931 the democratic movement, which had long played an important 
part in Japanese politics, began to subside. As time went on, the mili- 
tary leaders, men violently opposed to all forms of parliamentary gov- 
ernment, were able to secure ever more effective control over the organs 
of the state, and today the Japanese system of government differs from 
the European dictatorships only in that in Japan supreme power rests, 
not with a single individual, but with a small group of persons, most of 
them high ranking officers of the armed forces. 

In 1933 the cause of liberalism received another staggering blow 
when for all practical purposes the German Republic ceased to exist, its 
place taken by the Hiller Reich. To many liberals the defection of 
Germany from the liberal movement seemed more serious than any of 
the earlier developments elsewhere. After all, such persons argued, 
Turkey and Persia, even China, Japan, and Italy were from the political 
and economic point of view relatively backward countries. Perhaps 
their progress towards democracy had been too rapid. Perhaps they 
needed a brief breathing spell, a despotic interlude, before again trying 
to march to the ultimate liberal goal. But when Germany, one of the 
most modern and progressive countries, turned its back on the liberal 
tradition and embraced National Socialism, it seemed as if something 
must be wrong with the whole theory of the inevitable tendency towards 
democratic government. 

If the newly arisen dictators had been content to crush liberalism 
within the borders of their own countries it would have been bad enough- 
But this was not all. Before long these same dictators began to mani- 
fest a passionate desire to conquer and destroy their neighbors, more 



especially those neighbors which “were weak and effete “ enough to re- 
tain democratic regimes. The Japanese aggression in Manchuria and 
China, the Italian conquest of Ethiopia and Albania, were shocking 
enough to the liberal world which had gradually come to adopt a rather 
rigid code of international morality, but at least neither Ethiopia nor 
Albania was democratic, and Japan could make use of the excuse that 
Manchuria was bandit-infested and suffered from chronic misgovern- 
ment. Far more startling was the forcible annexation of Austria and the 
crushing of Czechoslovakia, the latter especially being a country genu- 
inely devoted to liberal ideals. Then came the blood and slaughter of 
World War II. Germany set about crushing, in rapid succession, Po- 
land, Denmark, Norway, Holland, and Belgium, and was able to make 
France pathetically impotent. The devotion of Poland to the liberal 
cause is open to question, but there can be no doubt that the govern- 
ments of the other countries were genuinely democratic in character. 
Nor can there be any doubt that, if Germany prevails, these countries 
will be forced to adopt some form of dictatorial regime. 

Such being the situation, it is obvious that the open-minded student 
of present-day politics, especially if he happens to be an Englishman or 
an American, is forced to adopt a very different attitude towards politi- 
cal problems and political tendencies from that of his predecessor three or 
four decades ago. He must face the fact that at present there is no in- 
evitable and world-wide tendency towards the liberalizing of govern- 
mental institutions. He must face the fact that if existing liberal sys- 
tems of government are to be preserved it is necessary that the believers 
in liberalism be prepared to struggle and, if need be, to fight for their 
preservation. The battle for liberalism is far from being lost, but for 
the moment liberalism is definitely on the defensive and is in urgent 
need of support from groups which formerly were content to let political 
problems alone or to drift aimlessly with the prevailing political tide. 

In this connection it is well to stress the fact that neither Fascism nor 
National Socialism is new or casual or an ephemeral movement. Both 
are the products of a long, slowly developing but deep-rooted tradition. 
This fact is of major importance. Many persons have been foolish 
enough to imagine that Fascism and National Socialism are the acci- 
dental products of temporary economic upsets in Italy and Germany, 
and that if once these economic dislocations were adjusted it would be 
easy for both countries to re-establish liberal regimes. Other persons 
are apt to think that the establishment of the Fascist and Nazi dictator- 
ships was due merely to the power and prestige secured by such leaders 



as Mussolini and Hitler, and that were these leaders to be removed, it 
would be comparatively simple to restore liberal institutions. To the 
present writer it appears that both these ideas are completely fallacious. 
It is undoubtedly true that the rise of Fascism and National Socialism 
was greatly aided by the economic stress which existed in Italy in 1922 
and in Germany in 1933, but it is also true that this economic stress 
would not have permitted the establishment on a permanent basis of 
the Fascist and Nazi regimes if there had not existed a widespread and 
deep-rooted feeling in both countries that liberal institutions were 
essentially pernicious; and this feeling, in turn, can be traced back to a 
political tradition and to a political philosophy which had been slowly 
emerging and crystallizing throughout the nineteenth century and dur- 
ing the early years of the twentieth century. 

It is obvious that the Fascist and Nazi movements owe much of their 
success to the fact that they were led by such outstanding personalities 
as Mussolini and Hitler, but it is equally true that the movements them- 
selves are of even greater importance and significance than the individ- 
ual leaders. Wherever there is widespread belief that dictatorship is the 
best form of government, it is not difficult to find persons to fill the office 
of dictator; and wherever there is a widespread dislike of dictatorship, 
it is difficult, if not impossible, for such persons as Mussolini or Hitler to 
seize the reins of power. In other words, the political philosophy which 
dominates the general public of a given country is the major factor which 
determines whether or not a would-be dictator is able to secure power. 
Mussolini and Hitler were successful only because of the gradual spread 
and wide acceptance of a political tradition which despised democracy 
and looked forward to dictatorial control. It is tragic but true that the 
removal of the present leaders would not result in the destruction of the 
Fascist and Nazi regimes as long as large numbers of the Italian and 
German peoples accept the basic tenets of the Fascist and Nazi ideolo- 
gies. Many of the doctrines of both regimes were formulated and began 
to infiltrate into the populace long before Mussolini and Hitler were 
born. We must beware lest they persist and retain powerful support 
long after Mussolini and Hitler are dead. 

The importance of what we may call the Fascist-Nazi tradition (we 
must use this name, although the tradition originated long before the 
establishment of Fascist and Nazi parties) becomes obvious when we 
realize that neither Mussolini nor Hitler is the creator of a new political 
philosophy. Both men are merely the popularizers of doctrines which 
Degan four centuries ago, which slowly developed and were transformed 



during the subsequent period, and which received their final formulation 
during the opening years of the twentieth century. If we would seek to 
understand the true nature of Fascism and National Socialism, there- 
fore, we cannot be content to study merely the speeches and writings of 
Mussolini or Hitler and their immediate followers, but must strive to 
understand the underlying political philosophy of which the Fascist and 
Nazi doctrines are concrete expressions. More especially is this im- 
portant because of the fact that if the Fascist and Nazi movements per* 
sist and retain their political power, in all probability they will hot only 
seek to carry out the official program formulated by their present lead- 
ers, but will also seek to apply many ideas which, though embodied in 
the general political tradition of which the Fascist and Nazi movements 
are merely constituent parts, have not as yet been expressly formulated 
by either the Fascist or Nazi leaders. A study of this tradition should 
not only, therefore, give us an insight into the past and present signifi- 
cance of the Fascist and Nazi regimes; it should also aid us in trying to 
discover the line of development which these regimes are likely to take 
in the future. 

It seems obvious that there is now going on a great world conflict be- 
tween the liberal movement on the one side and the movement which 
may be called Fascist -Nazi on the other. This conflict Is of importance 
not only for the development of political institutions on the continent of 
Europe, but also for the political future of all other portions of the world. 
If Germany and Italy are successful in Europe, more especially as they 
are now openly allied with Japan, it seems certain that they can and will 
impose governmental systems similar to their own upon all portions of 
Europe and Asia. The repercussions of such an event upon the Western 
Hemisphere are bound to be enormous. 

Quite apart from the possibility that the totalitarian powers may seek 
by economic, diplomatic, and military means to bring some, if not all, of 
the American countries within their orbit, a smashing Fascist-Nazi vic- 
tory in Europe would necessarily be followed by the rise of powerful 
groups inside the Americas determined to overthrow the existing liberal 
institutions in this area and to substitute for them institutions modeled 
upon, the Fascist or Nazi patterns. Political doctrines, like children’s 
diseases, are remarkably contagious, especially when they are associated 
with an air of glory as the result of diplomatic and military success. 
Already we hear in England and in America a number of voices, espe- 
cially among members of the younger generation, which murmur, 


'"Surely if the German regime has proved itself so efficient and so suc- 
cessful, we ought to adopt some of the essential features of this regime, 
so that we too can be efficient and successful.'" If the military triumph 
of Germany should prove permanent, it is certain that these voices will 
grow in number and in volume. 

We are now acutely aware that the liberals of a generation or two 
ago were completely wrong when they supposed that there is an inevita- 
ble and constant trend towards liberal institutions. At the same time 
we must be careful not to adopt the equally fallacious doctrine that there 
is now a constant and inevitable trend towards anti-liberal institutions, 
and that sooner or later we must all, willy-nilly, accept a Fascist or semi- 
Fascist system of government.' A study of the political history of the 
world from classical times to the present shows that at certain times and 
certain places there has existed for a considerable period a strong trend 
towards the establishment of free and democratic institutions. At 
other times and at other places there has existed an equally strong tend- 
ency to depart from or to suppress such institutions. But at no time 
has such a tendency been constant or even long-enduring, and in no case 
has such a tendency been inevitable or unavoidable. History shows 
that at any time a determined group of persons, dominated by a firm 
and zealous political faith, have been able to check and even reverse such 
a tendency. At a time when the world seemed to be dominated by 
liberal ideology, a comparatively small group of Fascists and Nazis 
were able to destroy the dominance of...


Popular posts from this blog

My good friend ( now deceased ), Mother Teresa of the Still River Mass convent , called me years before the McLucas story broke. Latest Comments 2Vermont JULY 30, 2019 I think the only thing I would add here is what seems like MV’S obsession with things of a sexual nature. Tom A JULY 30, 2019 He, like many, defend the institution with the zeal that should be used to defend the Faith. Sad. What Mr. Voris fails to admit is that it is the institution of the conciliar fake church that is the biggest enemy of the Faith. Lynda JULY 30, 2019 Blinded by secular values and prestige of man. coastalfarm JULY 30, 2019 Please see the article “Unmarked building, quiet legal help for accused priests” Dryden, Mich. (AP) for the priest Mr. Voris defends, Rev.Eduard Perrone of Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary Church also known as Assumption Grotto, is co-founder of Opus Bono Sacerdotii. This non-profit organization takes in accused priests and gives them shelter, legal defense, transportation, etc. Opus Bono claims to have helped over 8,000 priests and has raised over $8 million 2002-201

Might Biden be a Liar & Predator like McCarrick?

September 15, 2020   Everyone knows that sexual predator ex-cardinal Theodore McCarrick is a liar. His whole life was a lie of betrayal of the most sacred vows he took and the violation of the moral tenets of the Catholic faith which he desecrated. Most people don't realize that part of this desecration of lies included lying for "gravely sinful" Democrats like Joe Biden. McCarrick protected Biden when then head of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger (later to be Pope Benedict XVI) wrote that bishops were not to admit to Communion politicians like "gravely sinful" Biden who supports the killing of unborn babies. McCarrick lied for politicians like Biden by ignoring the important parts of the Ratzinger letter and told bishops not to ignore the Catholic Church law.  Last year, Fr. Robert Morey denied Holy Communion to the “gravely sinful” Biden following a "2004 decree signed jointly by the bishops of

The Biben Lying Machine: "Joe , do you know what else is a Sin besides Killing Babies? Lying... "

October 09, 2020   It appears that Joe Biden was even a lying machine in 2008 according to the post " Media Ignores Biden Repeatedly Lies During 'Meet the Press' Interview" on the Weasel Zippers website: Joe Biden Repeatedly Lies During "Meet the Press" Interview, Claims he Doesn't Support Taxpayer Funded Abortions.....   Joe, do you know what else is a sin besides killing babies? Lying... ... Joe Biden repeatedly made the claim in a Sunday interview on the NBC political show "Meet the Press" that he opposes taxpayer funding of abortions. However, a look at his voting record over the years reveals numerous instances where Barack Obama's pro-abortion running mate did exactly that. "I don't support public, public funding. I don't, because that flips the burden. That's then telling me I have to accept a different view," he said on the program. As recently as February, Biden voted against an amendmen