https://archive.org/stream/in.ernet.dli.2015.237119/2015.237119.From-Luther_djvu.txt
Under the Editorship of Edward McChesney Sait POMONA COLLEGE FROM Luther to Hitler THE HISTORY OF FASCIST-NAZI POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY William Montgomery McGovern PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY VISITING LECTURER ON GOVERNMENT HARVARD UNIVERSITY GEORGE G. HARRAP ^ CO, LTD. LONDON TORONTO BOMBAY SYDNEY Vbe &itoetr<ibc HftHM CAMBRIDGE • MASSACHUSETTS PRINTED IN THE U.S.A. DEDICATED TO TWO STAUNCH FRIENDS William Yandell Elliott AND Ralph W. E. Reid Editor’s Introduction Ideas, as well as men, may have a life that is worth telling about. Professor McGovern gives us here a unique biographical study. Through a period of four centuries he has traced the growth of certain doctrines which, according to official apologists, provide a foundation for the Fascist and Nazi regimes. Such a biography of ideas possesses great value as showing persistent continuity, in spite of all lapses and modi- fications; it also makes a more dramatic appeal because of its bearing upon the political phenomena of today. The relation between philosophical doctrines and human conduct will, of course, always be debatable. Does theory determine practice, or does practice determine theory? Has some pre-existing theory been seized upon to justify a course of action and then erroneously assumed to be the reason for such action — post hoc, ergo propter hoc? Whatever view we take. Doctor McGovern’s contribution has great significance. It is significant, first of all, because Fascists and Nazis alike profess to .have a philosophical basis for their political systems; and, secondly, because the fate of democracy elsewhere may be involved. Not long ago men spoke of democracy as permanent and as destined to encompass the whole world. Its onward march was “irresistible”; to discuss the comparative merits of other forms of government would be a waste of time; once having acquired control, the people would never relinquish it. This was the language commonly employed twenty years ago and even more recently. Then' came the shock — the recurrence of despotism, the establishment of the so-called dictatorships. Whether or not the explanation of this debdcle lies in the domain of theory, what Professor McGovern tells us about the Italian and .German ideologies and their genetic background has wider implications. Democracy appears to be on the defensive; and, in combating the enemy, it should know some- thing about the philosophical weapons that are being used against it. In addition to its timeliness, this book has several other claims to dis- tinction. Professor McGovern has the gift of making obscure and recon- dite philosophers, like Hegel and Green, comprehensible to the layman; and his scholarly equipment will save him from the accusation of being clear at the expense of accuracy. He does not write with the pedantry that so often afflicts the academic mind when it enters the region of philosophy. His exposition is never labored or abstrusb. Instead of con- viii editor’s introduction tenting himself with dull abstracts and sticking them away in appropri- ate pigeonholes, he constantly illuminates one point of view by means of contrast with or analogy to another. By this method the reader is enabled to get hold of nice shades and fine distinctions. He cannot but feel grateful to an expositor who, being an expert, can shed so clear a light on murky places. Doctor McGovern is a man of varied accomplishments. In. some quarters he may be best known as an anthropologist and explorer. His interest in these fields would be suggested by the content of his numerous books and by the legend of the shako and worm-eaten sheepskin coat (tailored in Tibet) which he is supposed to wear when the snow flies in Chicago. But he has not turned from anthropology for the moment to dabble as an amateur in political thought. He ranks as an authority in this field. He studied philosophy at Oxford (Ph.D., 1922), Berlin, and the Sorbonne; and he teaches political theory at Northwestern regularly, sometimes at Harvard. It is his familiarity with the philosophers that enables him to deal with them so freely and cogently. There is unity in the theme. We encounter a succession of philos- ophers from the Reformation down. But the materials are not hetero- geneous, not a mere potpourri of disconnected doctrines. The author is* laying before us the development of certain ideas that do form parts of a common design. Far from confusing us in a maze of incongruous subtle- ties, he is making plain some aspects of current practical politics. Never- theless, he has not confined himself narrowly to the specific theme — the background of Fascist and Nazi ideologies. Strict adherence to the straight line would have made the book less useful and less interesting. About any theorist the student will be curious to know something be- sides his attitude toward authoritarianism and toward what Doctor McGovern calls etatism (the subordination of the individual to the state). A tendency to include other phases of thought that are not alto- gether apposite to the main purpose gives the book additional value; for it is advisable to present the contribution of each theorist as a whole, without distorting it by overemphasis upon a single point. But what of the liberals, the opponents of authoritarianism and etatism? They have not been ignored. John Locke, for example, looms large in this discus- sion; for, in the growth of the absolutist tradition, his powerful argu- ments against it could not be ignored. Professor McGovern's text does not follow the conventional pattern. He covers a long period, but concentrates upon tracing one stream of thought to its culmination in the political systems of Mussolini and EDITOR S INTRODUCTION IX Hitler. He describes the course of the stream mainly in his own lan- guage, but he adds vividness by giving many excerpts from the original sources, as an' explorer in central Africa or the basin of the Amazon would have recourse to maps and photographs. The book is admirably suited to form the basis of a half-year course either in philosophy or in government; and, because it is so intimately related to contemporary problems, both teachers and students will be glad to use it as a substi- tute for traditional courses. Indeed, its appeal extends beyond college gates. At the present time eyes are focused upon Rome and Berlin, curious to discover what lies behind the vagaries of the Axis powers. Professor McGovern himself has such clear vision that he makes others see what would escape their attention otherwise. . The general reader, the man who has never opened a philosophical treatise or heard a lecture on philosophy, will find this book much to ]iis taste; for so lucidly are the thinkers interpreted that it can be understood easily without any previ- ous training. Edward McChesney Sait Acknowledgments In writing and in revising this book I have been greatly aided by the advice and assistance of many persons. I owe an especial debt of grati- tude to the following persons: Professor E. M. Sait of Pomona College; Professors A. R. Hatton, K. W. Colegrove, E. Schaub, D. T. Howard, and H. Simon of Northwestern University; Professors A. N. Holcombe, H. Bruening, C. H. Mcllwain, and Crane Brinton, and Doctor George Pettee of Harvard University. Each of these persons has read through one or more sections of the book. I am also deeply grateful to Mr. H. G. Sonthoff for many valuable suggestions and for his work in preparing the index. I have profited greatly by the criticisms made by these and other persons; it should be noted, however, that I alone am responsible for the opinions expressed. William M. McGovern Cambridge, Massachusetts Contents INTRODUCTION I . The Liberal and the Fascist Traditions . . . • . 3 A Study in Contrasts* PART ONE. THE EARLY PRECURSORS OF FASCISM II. The Effect of the Reformation upon Political Philosophy ii Th$ Legacy of the Middle Ages* The Results of the Reformation* Martin Luther. Henry VIII and the Anglican Church. Gallicanism. Grotius and the Rise of International Law* in. The Defense of Absolute Monarchy 49 The Divine Right of Kings (Belloy^ Barclay^ James I, Filmer')* Jean Bodin. Thomis Hobbes. IV. The Decay of Absolutism 80 The Rise of Liberalism QLocke, Montesquieu^ Rousseau^ The Conserva- tive Reaction in Eut^: Joseph de Maistre. The Conservative Reaction in England: Edmund Burke. The Conservative Reaction in America: the Federalists* PAkT TWO. THE IDEALIST SCHOOL AND THE REVIVAL OF ABSOLUTISM V. Immanuel Kant and His English Disciples .... 119 Immanuel Kant* T* H*' Green. Thomas Carlyle* VI. The Political Philosophy of Johann Gottlieb Fichte . 109 Fichte's Life and Times. Fichte's General Philosophy* The Etatisni of Fichte* The Authoritarianism of Fichte. Vn. The Political Philosophy of G. F. W. Hegel . . • 2159 Hegel's Life and Times* Hegel's General Philosophy* The Etatism of tiegel* The Authoritarianism of Hegel. ^ XIV CONTENTS PART THREE. THE DEVELOPMENT OF ABSOLUTISM IN THE NINETEENTH AND TW^ENTIETH CENTURIES VIII. Traditionalism and the Traditionalists . . *343 Joseph Heinrich von Trettschke, The Historical School of Jurisprudence (Savigny, Puchta^ Marne, Carter'). IX. Irrationalism and the Irrationalists 400 Irrationalism in General Philosophy (James, Bergson, Niets^sche), Irrationalism and Social Psychology in England and America (Wallas, McDougalf). Irrationalism and Social Psychology in Prance and Italy (Tarde, Durkheim, Le Bon, Sorel, Pareto). X. The Social Darwinists and Their Allies . . . -453 The General Implications of Social Darwinism (Spencer, Bagehot, GumplowicsJ. Eugenics and the Doctrine of Class Superiority (Galt on, Pearson, Stoddard). The Doctrine of Kacial Superiority (Gohineau, H. S. Chamberlain, H. Gunther). PART FOUR. THE TRIUMPH OF ABSOLUTISM FASCISM AND NATIONAL SOCIALISM XI. The Political Philosophy OF Fascism 531' Mussolini and the Rise of Fascism. The Ideological Background (Social Darwinism, Irrationalism, Traditionalism, Idealism). Fascism and Etatism. Fascism and Authoritarianism. Fascism and the Corporate State. XII. The Political Philosophy of National Socialism . . 596 Hitler and the Rise of the Na^i Party. The Ideological Background (Traditionalism, Idealism, Irrationalism, Social Darwinism). The Nazis and Etatism. The Nazis and Authoritarianism. Index 677 Introduction THE LIBERAL AND THE FASCIST TRADITIONS A STUDY IN CONTRASTS CHAPTER I The Liberal and the Fascist Traditions A Study in Contrasts To THE average Englishman, Frenchman, or American who was alive and interested in politics about the year 1912 the world seemed com- paratively simple. He was not only convinced that such things as democracy, majority rule, and representative government were excellent institutions; he was also firm in the belief that sooner or later these institutions were bound to prevail all over the world. Such a person was aware that such things as dictatorship, despotism, or even absolute monarchy continued to prevail in '‘backward coun- tries,” but it seemed clear that it was only a matter of time and of in- creasing civilization for these “relics of the dark ages” to be swept away. The tendency towards democracy and all the things which go with democracy was held to be inevitable. It was believed that Eng- land, France, and i^^merica were the most democratic merely because they were the most advanced countries. It was thought that such countries as Germany or Japan were politically somewhat retarded, but even in these regions there were strong democratic movements, and experts were willing to prophesy that within a few years the vestiges of despotic power which still prevailed would disappear. Elsewhere, in the very homelands of conservatism and of autocracy there seemed to be portents of a better day. Jn 1905 the Russian Czar had been forced to grant his subjects a popularly elected Duma. In 1906 a revolution forced the Shah of Persia to bestow upon the Persians a written constitution, a document which curbed many of his former absolute powers. In 1908 a similar revolution took place in Turkey as a result of which effective rulership was transferred from the Sultan to the Committee of Union and Progress, which was regarded as the agent of the Turkish people. It was generally admitted that many of the so- called republics in Latin America were merely veiled dictatorships, but even in this area there seemed to be portents that the dawn of true democracy was not far away. The Mexican Revolution of 1910 and the subsequent overthrow of the Dictator Diaz were widely hailed as the 4 INTRODUCTION first step in the Spanish -American march towards political liberalism. In 1911 the age-old monarchy in China was overthrown, and in its place there was established a republic modeled, on paper, after the most ap- proved European and American patterns. The Englishmen, French- men, and Americans of that generation read about these events in their newspapers and smiled approvingly and hopefully. Surely if Persia and Turkey and China were going democratic there was no final hope for despotism in any corner of the world. The World War of 1914-1918 came as a great shock to many persons who had looked forward to the peaceful progress and spread of demo- cratic ideals, but before long most Englishmen and Frenchmen came to look upon this conflict as a sort of necessary crusade of the forward- looking democratic powers against the backward-looking despotic pow- ers. Even in America the war came to be regarded, not as a mere battle between England or France and Germany, but as a battle between de- mocracy, liberalism, and freedom on the one side, and absolutism, tyranny, and divine right of kings on the other. It was largely because of this belief that America eventually entered the war herself. Was it not her duty, as a democratic power, to aid in “Making the World Safe for Democracy”? It was widely felt that if the “Kaiserism” of Ger- many were once overthrown, there would be and could be no further barriers to the peaceful and world-wide development of democratic insti- tutions to the end of time. How charming and attractive were all these beliefs and hopes and aspirations — and yet how childish do they appear in the light of subse- quent events. The democratic powers after much tribulation were indeed triumphant in battle. Not only was Germany defeated, but the German monarchy with its autocratic traditions was overthrown, and a democratically organized^ republic took its place. The era of despotism appeared to be over and yet — the millennium of liberalism failed to arrive. Even before the war was over, the Czarist regime in Russia was overthrown, but in its place, after a few months of turmoil, there arose, not a liberal republic for which so many democratically inclined persons had hoped, but a new type of dictatorship, a dictatorship of the proletar- iate in theory, a dictatorship of a small group of radical politicians in fact. In 1922 liberalism received another blow. Italy had for many decades most of the advantages and all the disadvantages of representa- tive and parliamentary government. But in the economic and political chaos which followed the World War the machinery of government practically collapsed, and with surprisingly little effort Mussolini was LIBERAL AND FASCIST TRADITIONS 5 able to impose the Fascist type of dictatorship upon the Italian kingdom. Not long afterwards a tendency towards dictatorial rule appeared in a number of other countries. In Turkey the ancient Sultanate was, to be sure, overthrown, but in its place there arose the strong one-man rule of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk who, under the title of President, exercised as rigid and autocratic control as any of the Khalifs in former times. In 1925 a similar transformation took place in Persia. The old dynasty was deposed, but its place was taken by a new dynasty, and the new Shah, Riza Pahlavi, has as absolute power over his Iranian subjects as has Mussolini over the Italians. In China the attempt to establish a republic along American lines failed miserably, and in the period 1926- 1928 supreme power over the Chinese state fell into the hands of a single political party, the Kuomintang, and more especially into the hands of one or two men, such as Chiang Kai-shek, who controlled this party. In 1931 the democratic movement, which had long played an important part in Japanese politics, began to subside. As time went on, the mili- tary leaders, men violently opposed to all forms of parliamentary gov- ernment, were able to secure ever more effective control over the organs of the state, and today the Japanese system of government differs from the European dictatorships only in that in Japan supreme power rests, not with a single individual, but with a small group of persons, most of them high ranking officers of the armed forces. In 1933 the cause of liberalism received another staggering blow when for all practical purposes the German Republic ceased to exist, its place taken by the Hiller Reich. To many liberals the defection of Germany from the liberal movement seemed more serious than any of the earlier developments elsewhere. After all, such persons argued, Turkey and Persia, even China, Japan, and Italy were from the political and economic point of view relatively backward countries. Perhaps their progress towards democracy had been too rapid. Perhaps they needed a brief breathing spell, a despotic interlude, before again trying to march to the ultimate liberal goal. But when Germany, one of the most modern and progressive countries, turned its back on the liberal tradition and embraced National Socialism, it seemed as if something must be wrong with the whole theory of the inevitable tendency towards democratic government. If the newly arisen dictators had been content to crush liberalism within the borders of their own countries it would have been bad enough- But this was not all. Before long these same dictators began to mani- fest a passionate desire to conquer and destroy their neighbors, more 6 INTRODUCTION especially those neighbors which “were weak and effete “ enough to re- tain democratic regimes. The Japanese aggression in Manchuria and China, the Italian conquest of Ethiopia and Albania, were shocking enough to the liberal world which had gradually come to adopt a rather rigid code of international morality, but at least neither Ethiopia nor Albania was democratic, and Japan could make use of the excuse that Manchuria was bandit-infested and suffered from chronic misgovern- ment. Far more startling was the forcible annexation of Austria and the crushing of Czechoslovakia, the latter especially being a country genu- inely devoted to liberal ideals. Then came the blood and slaughter of World War II. Germany set about crushing, in rapid succession, Po- land, Denmark, Norway, Holland, and Belgium, and was able to make France pathetically impotent. The devotion of Poland to the liberal cause is open to question, but there can be no doubt that the govern- ments of the other countries were genuinely democratic in character. Nor can there be any doubt that, if Germany prevails, these countries will be forced to adopt some form of dictatorial regime. Such being the situation, it is obvious that the open-minded student of present-day politics, especially if he happens to be an Englishman or an American, is forced to adopt a very different attitude towards politi- cal problems and political tendencies from that of his predecessor three or four decades ago. He must face the fact that at present there is no in- evitable and world-wide tendency towards the liberalizing of govern- mental institutions. He must face the fact that if existing liberal sys- tems of government are to be preserved it is necessary that the believers in liberalism be prepared to struggle and, if need be, to fight for their preservation. The battle for liberalism is far from being lost, but for the moment liberalism is definitely on the defensive and is in urgent need of support from groups which formerly were content to let political problems alone or to drift aimlessly with the prevailing political tide. In this connection it is well to stress the fact that neither Fascism nor National Socialism is new or casual or an ephemeral movement. Both are the products of a long, slowly developing but deep-rooted tradition. This fact is of major importance. Many persons have been foolish enough to imagine that Fascism and National Socialism are the acci- dental products of temporary economic upsets in Italy and Germany, and that if once these economic dislocations were adjusted it would be easy for both countries to re-establish liberal regimes. Other persons are apt to think that the establishment of the Fascist and Nazi dictator- ships was due merely to the power and prestige secured by such leaders LIBERAL AND FASCIST TRADITIONS 7 as Mussolini and Hitler, and that were these leaders to be removed, it would be comparatively simple to restore liberal institutions. To the present writer it appears that both these ideas are completely fallacious. It is undoubtedly true that the rise of Fascism and National Socialism was greatly aided by the economic stress which existed in Italy in 1922 and in Germany in 1933, but it is also true that this economic stress would not have permitted the establishment on a permanent basis of the Fascist and Nazi regimes if there had not existed a widespread and deep-rooted feeling in both countries that liberal institutions were essentially pernicious; and this feeling, in turn, can be traced back to a political tradition and to a political philosophy which had been slowly emerging and crystallizing throughout the nineteenth century and dur- ing the early years of the twentieth century. It is obvious that the Fascist and Nazi movements owe much of their success to the fact that they were led by such outstanding personalities as Mussolini and Hitler, but it is equally true that the movements them- selves are of even greater importance and significance than the individ- ual leaders. Wherever there is widespread belief that dictatorship is the best form of government, it is not difficult to find persons to fill the office of dictator; and wherever there is a widespread dislike of dictatorship, it is difficult, if not impossible, for such persons as Mussolini or Hitler to seize the reins of power. In other words, the political philosophy which dominates the general public of a given country is the major factor which determines whether or not a would-be dictator is able to secure power. Mussolini and Hitler were successful only because of the gradual spread and wide acceptance of a political tradition which despised democracy and looked forward to dictatorial control. It is tragic but true that the removal of the present leaders would not result in the destruction of the Fascist and Nazi regimes as long as large numbers of the Italian and German peoples accept the basic tenets of the Fascist and Nazi ideolo- gies. Many of the doctrines of both regimes were formulated and began to infiltrate into the populace long before Mussolini and Hitler were born. We must beware lest they persist and retain powerful support long after Mussolini and Hitler are dead. The importance of what we may call the Fascist-Nazi tradition (we must use this name, although the tradition originated long before the establishment of Fascist and Nazi parties) becomes obvious when we realize that neither Mussolini nor Hitler is the creator of a new political philosophy. Both men are merely the popularizers of doctrines which Degan four centuries ago, which slowly developed and were transformed 8 INTRODUCTION during the subsequent period, and which received their final formulation during the opening years of the twentieth century. If we would seek to understand the true nature of Fascism and National Socialism, there- fore, we cannot be content to study merely the speeches and writings of Mussolini or Hitler and their immediate followers, but must strive to understand the underlying political philosophy of which the Fascist and Nazi doctrines are concrete expressions. More especially is this im- portant because of the fact that if the Fascist and Nazi movements per* sist and retain their political power, in all probability they will hot only seek to carry out the official program formulated by their present lead- ers, but will also seek to apply many ideas which, though embodied in the general political tradition of which the Fascist and Nazi movements are merely constituent parts, have not as yet been expressly formulated by either the Fascist or Nazi leaders. A study of this tradition should not only, therefore, give us an insight into the past and present signifi- cance of the Fascist and Nazi regimes; it should also aid us in trying to discover the line of development which these regimes are likely to take in the future. It seems obvious that there is now going on a great world conflict be- tween the liberal movement on the one side and the movement which may be called Fascist -Nazi on the other. This conflict Is of importance not only for the development of political institutions on the continent of Europe, but also for the political future of all other portions of the world. If Germany and Italy are successful in Europe, more especially as they are now openly allied with Japan, it seems certain that they can and will impose governmental systems similar to their own upon all portions of Europe and Asia. The repercussions of such an event upon the Western Hemisphere are bound to be enormous. Quite apart from the possibility that the totalitarian powers may seek by economic, diplomatic, and military means to bring some, if not all, of the American countries within their orbit, a smashing Fascist-Nazi vic- tory in Europe would necessarily be followed by the rise of powerful groups inside the Americas determined to overthrow the existing liberal institutions in this area and to substitute for them institutions modeled upon, the Fascist or Nazi patterns. Political doctrines, like children’s diseases, are remarkably contagious, especially when they are associated with an air of glory as the result of diplomatic and military success. Already we hear in England and in America a number of voices, espe- cially among members of the younger generation, which murmur, LIBERAL AND FASCIST TRADITIONS 9 '"Surely if the German regime has proved itself so efficient and so suc- cessful, we ought to adopt some of the essential features of this regime, so that we too can be efficient and successful.'" If the military triumph of Germany should prove permanent, it is certain that these voices will grow in number and in volume. We are now acutely aware that the liberals of a generation or two ago were completely wrong when they supposed that there is an inevita- ble and constant trend towards liberal institutions. At the same time we must be careful not to adopt the equally fallacious doctrine that there is now a constant and inevitable trend towards anti-liberal institutions, and that sooner or later we must all, willy-nilly, accept a Fascist or semi- Fascist system of government.' A study of the political history of the world from classical times to the present shows that at certain times and certain places there has existed for a considerable period a strong trend towards the establishment of free and democratic institutions. At other times and at other places there has existed an equally strong tend- ency to depart from or to suppress such institutions. But at no time has such a tendency been constant or even long-enduring, and in no case has such a tendency been inevitable or unavoidable. History shows that at any time a determined group of persons, dominated by a firm and zealous political faith, have been able to check and even reverse such a tendency. At a time when the world seemed to be dominated by liberal ideology, a comparatively small group of Fascists and Nazis were able to destroy the dominance of...
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