https://www.researchgate.net/publication/272879650_On_the_Difference_Between_Social_Justice_and_Christian_Charity : Charity. We must now turn to the virtue of charity to see in what way it is necessary to give to others.  e primary diff erence between justice and charity is that justice is a legal debt, whereas charity is a moral debt.58 A moral debt is one that arises because of a kind of friendship, one in which we wish another well simply because of the love we have for that person.59 For friends, there is no need for a strict impersonal rule of equality (that is, justice); indeed, as friends, we overlook the rational demands of justice and give to the other simply for the sake of friendship.60 Hence, it is in the discussion of charity that Aquinas covers those actions closest in spirit to liberality: mercy, benefi cence, and almsgiving.61  ese ideas seem to embody the liberal notion of distributive justice, to give to those who are least advantaged. However, in order to see how the  omistic conception is in fact radically diff erent from the liberal principle, we need to analyze the basis for our obligations in charity. e critical premise for Aquinas’s discussion of these acts of charity is that they are all done for the sake of God, since God is the ultimate subject of char-ity.62

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/272879650_On_the_Difference_Between_Social_Justice_and_Christian_Charity PDF) On the Difference Between Social Justice and Christian CharityPDF) On the Difference Between Social Justice and Christian CharityPDF) On the Difference Between Social Justice and Christian Charity J  C C 

be used to assert that justice’s primary concern should be a redistribution of

material wealth for the sake of individualistic pursuits.

Now, if liberality is not a precept of justice, does this mean that it is purely

supererogatory, that is, that we are not obliged in any way to give the greatest

benefi t to the least advantaged? As both Paul Weithman and Stephen Pope have

argued,57 for Aquinas there is an obligation to give charitable gifts, but this is by

its nature a precept of the virtue of charity and not of justice.

V.

Charity. We must now turn to the virtue of charity to see in what way it is

necessary to give to others.  e primary diff erence between justice and charity

is that justice is a legal debt, whereas charity is a moral debt.58 A moral debt is

one that arises because of a kind of friendship, one in which we wish another

well simply because of the love we have for that person.59 For friends, there is no

need for a strict impersonal rule of equality (that is, justice); indeed, as friends,

we overlook the rational demands of justice and give to the other simply for the

sake of friendship.60 Hence, it is in the discussion of charity that Aquinas covers

those actions closest in spirit to liberality: mercy, benefi cence, and almsgiving.61

 ese ideas seem to embody the liberal notion of distributive justice, to give

to those who are least advantaged. However, in order to see how the  omistic

conception is in fact radically diff erent from the liberal principle, we need to

analyze the basis for our obligations in charity.

 e critical premise for Aquinas’s discussion of these acts of charity is that

they are all done for the sake of God, since God is the ultimate subject of char-

ity.62  J  C C 

be used to assert that justice’s primary concern should be a redistribution of

material wealth for the sake of individualistic pursuits.

Now, if liberality is not a precept of justice, does this mean that it is purely

supererogatory, that is, that we are not obliged in any way to give the greatest

benefi t to the least advantaged? As both Paul Weithman and Stephen Pope have

argued,57 for Aquinas there is an obligation to give charitable gifts, but this is by

its nature a precept of the virtue of charity and not of justice.

V.

Charity. We must now turn to the virtue of charity to see in what way it is

necessary to give to others.  e primary diff erence between justice and charity

is that justice is a legal debt, whereas charity is a moral debt.58 A moral debt is

one that arises because of a kind of friendship, one in which we wish another

well simply because of the love we have for that person.59 For friends, there is no

need for a strict impersonal rule of equality (that is, justice); indeed, as friends,

we overlook the rational demands of justice and give to the other simply for the

sake of friendship.60 Hence, it is in the discussion of charity that Aquinas covers

those actions closest in spirit to liberality: mercy, benefi cence, and almsgiving.61

 ese ideas seem to embody the liberal notion of distributive justice, to give

to those who are least advantaged. However, in order to see how the  omistic

conception is in fact radically diff erent from the liberal principle, we need to

analyze the basis for our obligations in charity.

 e critical premise for Aquinas’s discussion of these acts of charity is that

they are all done for the sake of God, since God is the ultimate subject of char-

ity.62  J  C C 

be used to assert that justice’s primary concern should be a redistribution of

material wealth for the sake of individualistic pursuits.

Now, if liberality is not a precept of justice, does this mean that it is purely

supererogatory, that is, that we are not obliged in any way to give the greatest

benefi t to the least advantaged? As both Paul Weithman and Stephen Pope have

argued,57 for Aquinas there is an obligation to give charitable gifts, but this is by

its nature a precept of the virtue of charity and not of justice.

V.

Charity. We must now turn to the virtue of charity to see in what way it is

necessary to give to others.  e primary diff erence between justice and charity

is that justice is a legal debt, whereas charity is a moral debt.58 A moral debt is

one that arises because of a kind of friendship, one in which we wish another

well simply because of the love we have for that person.59 For friends, there is no

need for a strict impersonal rule of equality (that is, justice); indeed, as friends,

we overlook the rational demands of justice and give to the other simply for the

sake of friendship.60 Hence, it is in the discussion of charity that Aquinas covers

those actions closest in spirit to liberality: mercy, benefi cence, and almsgiving.61

 ese ideas seem to embody the liberal notion of distributive justice, to give

to those who are least advantaged. However, in order to see how the  omistic

conception is in fact radically diff erent from the liberal principle, we need to

analyze the basis for our obligations in charity.

 e critical premise for Aquinas’s discussion of these acts of charity is that

they are all done for the sake of God, since God is the ultimate subject of char-

ity.62