Contrary to Lamont's rejection of (purportedly) Suarez's understanding of a right as a subjective moral power, I show that it is understood in relation to the natural moral law, an objective order of justice, which is precisely what Lamont advocates for when he tries to make sense of the way one can accept the Church's understanding of rights. There is perhaps confusion over the notion of "subjective," which Lamont seems to think is a monadic property of an individual, and as a result rights are expressed "in human law just as they are, without needing significant interpretation." Id. at 213. He goes on to equate this understanding of a subjective natural right with Hobbes and Locke. This notion of a subjective natural right is not Suarez's, and it is this connection from Suarez to these modern thinkers - and now, our contemporary state of affairs - that I am contesting. However, it needs to be noted that I am not addressing Lamont's arguments about the specific understanding of natural law and conscience which Suarez had; rather, I am taking a more general approach to show the compatibility of natural rights and natural law, regardless of how Suarez may have understood natural law in relation to practical reason and the Divine will and conscience. Suarez still considered the natural law to obtain with respect to right moral action. In short, subjective natural rights do not have to be grounded in a Hobbesian or Lockean anthropology. Contra, e.g., Kries, supra note 2, at 412. 9 See Tierney, supra note 2, at 343-44. At the very least, Tierney does not clearly and elaborately explain some important differences between pre-modern and contemporary rights.
I will show that Suarez provides an understanding of and justification for a natural right as a moral power or faculty pertaining to the individual subject ...
Contra Lamont, supra note 3, at 179-81. Contrary to Lamont's rejection of (purportedly) Suarez's understanding of a right as a subjective moral power, I show that it is understood in relation to the natural moral law, an objective order of justice, which is precisely what Lamont advocates for when he tries to make sense of the way one can accept the Church's understanding of rights. There is perhaps confusion over the notion of "subjective," which Lamont seems to think is a monadic property of an individual, and as a result rights are expressed "in human law just as they are, without needing significant interpretation." Id. at 213. He goes on to equate this understanding of a subjective natural right with Hobbes and Locke. This notion of a subjective natural right is not Suarez's, and it is this connection from Suarez to these modern thinkers - and now, our contemporary state of affairs - that I am contesting. However, it needs to be noted that I am not addressing Lamont's arguments about the specific understanding of natural law and conscience which Suarez had; rather, I am taking a more general approach to show the compatibility of natural rights and natural law, regardless of how Suarez may have understood natural law in relation to practical reason and the Divine will and conscience. Suarez still considered the natural law to obtain with respect to right moral action. In short, subjective natural rights do not have to be grounded in a Hobbesian or Lockean anthropology. Contra, e.g., Kries, supra note 2, at 412. 9 See Tierney, supra note 2, at 343-44. At the very least, Tierney does not clearly and elaborately explain some important differences between pre-modern and contemporary rights.
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