Villey: Nature as the Source of the Just Let us then have the humility to ask classical philosophy again about the sources of the just. First a preliminary remark: the texts of Aristotle and Aquinas on which I have so far commented, have taught us nothing yet on this question; they concerned exclusively the object of justice, not its sources. We still do not know whether there is a natural just. To say that justice means to 'allocate to each his right' informs us neither about the content nor about the means which we could have to determine the right of each; it merely indicates its form in a Kantian sense. To say that the just is to be analysed as a certain proportion does not tell me which it is. I know that it is just to pay the just price to my seller, that is to say a sum equal to the value of the merchandise, but it is still necessary to estimate this value. I know that the honours and public offices will be justly distributed if a certain correspondence is respected as regards the persons of the citizens; but I still do not know which sort of correspondence. Aristotle warns us that the solutions would be different under a democratic regime (where the number of votes counts) from those under an aristocratic regime where these solutions are calculated according to virtue, wealth, or capacities. Choosing between these two criteria, which will lead to opposite results, is not his concern at this stage. Modern readers, anxious to obtain an answer which serves their passions, be these liberal or socialist, hurry to read a solution where the text refrained from premature conclusions: of the cuique suum tribuere they make a justification of liberal property - a program for social reforms out of the just price; or of distributive justice - a choice in favour of aristocracy. There is nothing