Lamont: JP II...apostolic authority, teaches a right to life that forbids the deliberate killing of the innocent (Evangelium vitae 57). Absolute moral norms thus provide a basis for exceptionless natural rights. Another resource is the assertion by St. Thomas that there are rules of natural equity that bind as a general rule, but that are subject to exceptions. The example he gives is returning a deposit to a depositor, something that is required by natural equity but that ought not to be done if the deposit is a sword that the depositor will use to commit murder. Such rules of natural equity form the basis for rights that are natural, although not exceptionless. A further resource is what might be called "Maritainian" rights-that is, statements of goods that a society ought to pursue, such as health and education. Much of the Church's teaching that is couched in terms of human rights is simply enunciations of general rules of equity and desirable goods to be pursued, applied to particular situations where these rules and goods are being neglected. These three categories of rights together cover the area of Catholic teachings in human rights. Villey is right to say that the terminology of human rights is a misleading way of framing these teachings, but that does not mean that the teachings themselves are not important and true. Villey indeed acknowledges this. He does not criticize the substance of Church teachings on rights and justice. He only objects to their expression in the language of human rights, and to the theological accounts that have been built upon these teachings-accounts that wrongly attempt to derive a blueprint for a just society from them, in the fashion of the blueprint for a just society found in modern natural-law theories. 105 105 See Villey's discussion in 'Une e
John Paul II... apostolic authority, teaches a right to life that forbids the deliberate killing of the innocent (Evangelium vitae 57). Absolute moral norms thus provide a basis for exceptionless natural rights. Another resource is the assertion by St. Thomas that there are rules of natural equity that bind as a general rule, but that are subject to exceptions. The example he gives is returning a deposit to a depositor, something that is required by natural equity but that ought not to be done if the deposit is a sword that the depositor will use to commit murder. Such rules of natural equity form the basis for rights that are natural, although not exceptionless. A further resource is what might be called "Maritainian" rights-that is, statements of goods that a society ought to pursue, such as health and education. Much of the Church's teaching that is couched in terms of human rights is simply enunciations of general rules of equity and desirable goods to be pursued, applied to particular situations where these rules and goods are being neglected. These three categories of rights together cover the area of Catholic teachings in human rights. Villey is right to say that the terminology of human rights is a misleading way of framing these teachings, but that does not mean that the teachings themselves are not important and true. Villey indeed acknowledges this. He does not criticize the substance of Church teachings on rights and justice. He only objects to their expression in the language of human rights, and to the theological accounts that have been built upon these teachings-accounts that wrongly attempt to derive a blueprint for a just society from them, in the fashion of the blueprint for a just society found in modern natural-law theories. 105 105 See Villey's discussion in 'Une e
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