According to the late political theorist and theologian Father Ernest Fortin, modern liberal democracy—pioneered by thinkers like John Locke—fundamentally redefines and limits classical and Christian notions of social justice and social friendship.Fortin argues that the Lockean liberal framework replaces a thick, moral community ordered toward virtue and a shared "common good" with a minimalist, procedural framework structured around individual rights, self-interest, and civil peace.Under Lockean liberal terms, Fortin views the definitions of these concepts as follows:1. Social Justice as a Procedural "Rule of the Game"In classical and Catholic thought (such as Thomism), social justice is a moral virtue requiring individuals to actively direct their actions toward the holistic common good of the community.According to Fortin's critique of Lockean liberalism:The Effacement of Duties for Rights: Locke shifts the baseline of political community from natural duties to autonomous individual rights (specifically life, liberty, and private property).Procedural Neutrality: Social justice is stripped of its teleological (end-oriented) moral framework. Instead of aiming for moral perfection or spiritual flourishing, justice becomes procedural.The Rules of the Game: Fortin writes that liberalism trades the "rules of life" for the "rules of the game". Social justice in Lockean terms simply means guaranteeing an open, neutral marketplace where individuals can pursue their own separate interests safely without violating the identical rights of others.2. Social Friendship as Minimalist Civic Peace and TolerationIn the pre-modern tradition (such as Aristotelianism), "civic friendship" (politike philia) is the essential bond of a city, where citizens share core moral convictions and care for one another's character.According to Fortin, Locke's philosophy radically thins this concept:Calculated Mutual Benefit: Because Locke's state of nature is driven by self-preservation and the protection of private property, political community is formed out of a calculated social contract rather than an intrinsic, natural desire for moral friendship.Toleration Instead of Friendship: Social friendship is effectively downgraded to civic toleration and peace. Citizens do not need to love one another or share a unified vision of the good life; they merely need to agree not to interfere with each other.Lowering the Moral Horizon: Fortin emphasizes that by lowering the goals of politics from "virtue" to "comfort and security," Locke establishes a system where genuine social friendship is no longer a political requirement. Cohesion is maintained by institutional checks and balances, commercial interdependence, and legal frameworks, rather than shared moral affection.Summary of Fortin's CritiqueFor Fortin, defining social justice and social friendship in Lockean liberal terms results in a paradox. It provides immense practical benefits—such as individual liberty, civil peace, and material comfort. However, it fails to foster a deep attachment to the public good, transforming society into a collection of "unenumbered, self-contained individuals" whose social bonds are transactional rather than transformative.If you are exploring this for a specific paper or project, would you like me to focus more on how Fortin contrasts Locke with Thomas Aquinas, or how this critique applies to modern Catholic Social Teaching?

According to the late political theorist and theologian Father Ernest Fortin, modern liberal democracy—pioneered by thinkers like John Locke—fundamentally redefines and limits classical and Christian notions of social justice and social friendship. [1, 2]

Fortin argues that the Lockean liberal framework replaces a thick, moral community ordered toward virtue and a shared "common good" with a minimalist, procedural framework structured around individual rights, self-interest, and civil peace. [1, 2]

Under Lockean liberal terms, Fortin views the definitions of these concepts as follows:

1. Social Justice as a Procedural "Rule of the Game"

In classical and Catholic thought (such as Thomism), social justice is a moral virtue requiring individuals to actively direct their actions toward the holistic common good of the community. [1, 2]

According to Fortin's critique of Lockean liberalism:

• The Effacement of Duties for Rights: Locke shifts the baseline of political community from natural duties to autonomous individual rights (specifically life, liberty, and private property). [1, 2]
• Procedural Neutrality: Social justice is stripped of its teleological (end-oriented) moral framework. Instead of aiming for moral perfection or spiritual flourishing, justice becomes procedural. [1]
• The Rules of the Game: Fortin writes that liberalism trades the "rules of life" for the "rules of the game". Social justice in Lockean terms simply means guaranteeing an open, neutral marketplace where individuals can pursue their own separate interests safely without violating the identical rights of others. [1, 2]

2. Social Friendship as Minimalist Civic Peace and Toleration

In the pre-modern tradition (such as Aristotelianism), "civic friendship" (politike philia) is the essential bond of a city, where citizens share core moral convictions and care for one another's character. [1]

According to Fortin, Locke's philosophy radically thins this concept:

• Calculated Mutual Benefit: Because Locke's state of nature is driven by self-preservation and the protection of private property, political community is formed out of a calculated social contract rather than an intrinsic, natural desire for moral friendship. [1, 2]
• Toleration Instead of Friendship: Social friendship is effectively downgraded to civic toleration and peace. Citizens do not need to love one another or share a unified vision of the good life; they merely need to agree not to interfere with each other. [1, 2]
• Lowering the Moral Horizon: Fortin emphasizes that by lowering the goals of politics from "virtue" to "comfort and security," Locke establishes a system where genuine social friendship is no longer a political requirement. Cohesion is maintained by institutional checks and balances, commercial interdependence, and legal frameworks, rather than shared moral affection. [1, 2, 3]

Summary of Fortin's Critique

For Fortin, defining social justice and social friendship in Lockean liberal terms results in a paradox. It provides immense practical benefits—such as individual liberty, civil peace, and material comfort. However, it fails to foster a deep attachment to the public good, transforming society into a collection of "unenumbered, self-contained individuals" whose social bonds are transactional rather than transformative. [1, 2, 3]

If you are exploring this for a specific paper or project, would you like me to focus more on how Fortin contrasts Locke with Thomas Aquinas, or how this critique applies to modern Catholic Social Teaching?