Kraynak’s View of Locke as an Evolution from HobbesContinuity of the Modern Project: Kraynak views John Locke not as a sharp opponent who rescued natural law, but as a direct beneficiary and logical evolution of the Hobbesian revolution.

Kraynak’s View of Locke as an Evolution from Hobbes

Continuity of the Modern Project: Kraynak views John Locke not as a sharp opponent who rescued natural law, but as a direct beneficiary and logical evolution of the Hobbesian revolution. [1, 2, 3]

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WORD S THAT SOUN D ALIKE BUT HAVE DIFFERENT MEANINGS : CHRISTIAN "NATURAL RIGHTS" AN D KANTIA N INSPIRED "HUMA N RIGHTS" Gary Glenn Northern Illinois University Robert Krayriak^s Christian Faith and Moder n Democrac y imprecisely diagnoses a problem in modern rights doctrines. Kraynak conflates the modern notion of autonomous rights with natural rights as traditionally understood in Christian thought. It is still possible to defend the Christian-Aristotelian version of rights rather than let autonomy-based rights lead even Christians to licentiousness or despotism. \ Kraynak's boo k reminded me of encountering Le o Strauss' Natural Right and History 40 years ago. Strauss makes sense of the history of political philosophy, culminating in its demise in the thought of Heidegger and what, after Strauss' death, woul d be called "post-modernism." H e helped me understand wh y the natural law tradition in whic h I had been educated has so little currenc y outside of faith-protected intellectual enclaves. It is because moder n rationalism , developin g fro m its Machiavellian, Cartesia n and Hobbesian seeds, issues in a 20th centur y conviction that ho w w e should live together is nothing but a construction of human will rather than an apprehending by reason. Similarly, Kraynak makes sense of ho w Kantian philosophy transformed Christian political thought since Worl d Wa r II. Both book s give "big picture" accounts of ho w ideas change and the differences the changes make in ou r understanding of decisive political and religious matters. Kraynak's historically informed boo k focuses o n the last half of the 20th centur y His perspective is, at once , that of a theologically informed believer and a scholar of the histor y of political philosophy. Kraynak is struc k by the "historical anomaly"' that "at the beginning of the third millennium nearly all Christians believe that the for m of government mos t compatible with their ethical and spiritual teachings is liberal democracy " GLENN 21 (Kraynak, 148). lndeed,"moder n theologians " teach that Christianit y "necesson/y entails on e specific for m of government, namely...liberal democrac y founded o n human rights" (Kraynak , 5. emphasis added). In contrast, "man y great theologians of the past understoo d it [Christianity] t o be compatible with kingship, hierarchy o r authoritarian institutions (Kraynak, xiii). Furthermore , "the Christian tradition has been rather illiberal and undemocrati c fo r muc h of its history"(Kraynak , 3). H e contrast s this moder n situation wit h the Augustinian tradition whic h denies that Christianit y entails any particular political orde r and whos e political teaching is prudential and concerne d with limiting government in orde r t o protec t the right t o teach and exercise faith. H e finds the cor e of this revolution in " a heightened sensitivity t o the demands of human dignity in the moder n age" (Kraynak, 5); in major 20th centur y Catholi c thinkers; the Vatican Council' s "Declaratio n o n Religious Freedom " {Dignitatis Humanae); "Th e Constitutio n of the Churc h in the Moder n World " {Gaudium et Spes); and the Catechisnn of the Catholic Church regarding the "rights that flow fro m his dignity as a creature " (Kraynak, 157). II Kraynak's mos t theoretically far reaching and politically consequential argument is his critique of rights language. H e argues persuasively that, especially since Worl d Wa r II, "Th e [Catholic] church has chosen t o speak the language of Kantian Christianit y about the human person rather than in the language of Augustinian o r Thomisti c Christianit y about the inherently limited ends of the tempora l realm." "[T]he language of Kantian Christianity " but not of pre-Kantian Christian thought, speaks unconditionally of "the rights and dignity of the human person " (Kraynak, 222). Kraynak grants that, in the short run, this "rights and dignity" language serves the goo d end of aiming t o decentralize and limit the scop e of state powe r and that it has " a certain rhetorical advantage in a worl d that know s and respects only moder n categories of thought." But he thinks it woul d be better for Christians at least t o say "that the tw o Cities defines the principle and ends of social institutions and that the human person is derived fro m it," i.e., fro m "the true hierarchy of ends." Otherwis e the danger is that "rights and dignity" will be understoo d "in contemporar y secular term s and wil l [among othe r things] weaken subsidiarity by increasing demands t o expand the centralized bureaucratic state" (Kraynak, 222-23). Whil e Kant sometimes speaks an olde r liberal and even Christian language of rights "by nature," he also speaks of "the right of humanity in ou r o w n person." ^ Thi s right is "freedo m (independence fro m constraint of another's will) insofar as it is compatible with the freedo m of everyone else," and wha t flows fro m that. By stressing "humanity " rather than either "natural" o r "inalienable rights," Kant decisively modifies the olde r language of rights in a 22 CATHOLIC SOCLVL SCIENCE REVIEW way that harms Christian faith. "f'^J^^^' ^ rights are not only powerful weapons against tyranny; they also carr y skeptical and subversive assumptions that undermine all authority...the skeptical baggage of rights is so intimately tied t o conceptions of autonomou s freedo m that it is nearly impossible t o stop human rights fro m subverting all authority and social cohesion...[even] the ver y idea of an objective Good , undermining belief not only in God , virtue and the commo n goo d but also in the doctrine of rights themselves " (Kraynak, 169. emphasis added). This self-destructiveness is at least on e important reason why "Christia n faith is weakened fro m within by embracing democrati c human rights as an inference fro m the [Kantian] dignity of the person " (Kraynak, 168). But while he is particularly concerne d about such Kantian inspired rights, his argument conflates rights as such with the specifically Kantian version so as t o cast doub t o n all ideas of "rights." This conflation is first evident in the books ' Index. Unde r "natural rights" it says "se e human rights" and the latter entr y says "huma n (natural) rights." But his argument confirms the Indexes' conflation. A t first only Kantian rights "carr y skeptical and subversive assumption about all authority," but the next sentence elides that into "rights " simply. "Rights challenge and subvert all authority...." "[T]he skeptical baggage of rights" suggests that all rights teachings are premised o n skepticism. Hence , he doubts that any rights teaching can be prevented "fro m undermining legitimate authority as wel l as tyranny" (Kraynak, 169). This conflation imprecisely diagnoses the problem he has identified. A mor e precise diagnosis is that "human rights" and "democrati c human rights" connecte d t o Kantian "dignity" are the problem . Kant's idea that human dignity is grounded in ou r individual autonomy implies that freedo m and rights are "unconditional." That is the problem , not rights as such. N o t all ideas of rights need be unconditional. Fo r example, Kant's rights doctrine concludes that "the on e and only legitimate constitution is a pure republic-meaning a representative democrac y that protects human rights in the name of the people " (Kraynak, 152). But Hobbes , the founder of the moder n natural rights teaching, says monarchy is superior but countenances both aristocracy and democracy.^ An d Locke , wh o moved natural rights in a mor e egalitarian and republican direction, acknowledges the equal legitimacy of "democracy," "oligarchy" and "monarchy," of different kinds of monarchy (hereditary o r elective), and even such "compoun d and mixed forms of government as they [the people] think good.'"^ Clearly, early liberalism's variety of legitimate regimes is less doctrinaire,^ that is mor e prudential, than Kant's (following Rousseau's) teaching that only democrac y is legitimate. Kraynak is correc t that this early liberal natural rights teaching is already skeptical about Providence, arguably subversive of authority, and even posits an individualism that leans in the direction of autonomy (Kraynak, 32-33). But it does not yet issue in Kant's political doctrinairism. It is therefore mor e moderate , and less dangerous, than Kant. Hence , on e prudential option for GLENN 23 contemporar y Christians is t o defend the olde r liberalism, rather than abandon rights as such. An d while Kraynak does not explicitly recommen d such abandonment, his relentless attack o n all ideas of rights apparently points in that direction. Ill Anothe r prudential optio n Christians might utilize, whic h should not suffer fro m Kantia n doctrinairism , is th e pre-Hobbesia n Christia n understanding of natural rights. Whil e Krayna k is correc t that "...the Church...has com e t o accept som e of the political ideas...such as God-give n natural rights...," his ow n tex t gives grounds t o doub t that these wer e '"initially propose d by rational religion [of the Enlightenment]"(Kraynak, 133. emphasis added). Ho w can that be whe n Kraynak acknowledges the pre-Enlightenment teaching of Suarez (1548-1617) that individuals have natural rights "embedde d in the social nature of man," and whic h is consistent with "the primac y of the commo n good " (Kraynak, 122-23)? Moreover, Vitori a (1483-1546) and Las Casas (1474-1566) taught that all men , mos t particularly the America n Indians, have a natural right t o "dominion " (roughly "property"), t o self-defense, and t o liberty fro m being ruled by other s withou t their consent. Hence , "the colonial conques t of Indians was judged t o be unjust" (Kraynak, 136). Still, Kraynak asserts that Vitori a and Las Casas did not "quite " develop claims of "natural o r human rights." Apparentl y he thinks this because he [Vitoria following Suarez] "still follows the traditional idea that a right is a grant fro m the commo n goo d rather than a claim derived fro m the primac y of the individual will" (Kraynak, 137-38). Thi s last point might shed light o n Kraynak's seemingly factual erro r that "God-give n natural rights" "/n/t/o//y" arose as part of the rational religion of the Enlightenment, rather than in the 16th-17th centur y school of Christian - Aristoteleans at Salamanca.^ Fo r the m "natural rights" belong t o individuals w h o are by nature part of civil societ y In contrast, early moder n "natural rights" belong t o individuals wh o are not by nature part of society, wh o by nature live in a non-social "state of nature." This is conceptualized variously as a "wa r of all against all" (Hobbes ) and a condition of innocence, moderat e desires, solitariness, and peace (Rousseau). Kant's individual "autonomy"' ^ derives fro m Rousseau. Moreover, Christian-Aristotelian rights wer e inferences fro m the duties of natural law "as means towar d realizing an objective hierarchy of ends." T h e duties wer e primar y and foundational t o the rights. However, Kraynak says, such rights "are not Vights' properl y speaking but only conditional good s subservient t o higher goods." In particular, they provide "n o justification for claiming that individuals have a natural right t o pursue happiness as they see fit" (Kraynak, 170). In contrast, moder n natural rights make rights primar y (as 24 CATHOLIC SOCL\L SCIENCE REVIEW deriving fro m strong natural desires which on e cannot rationally be expected t o deny) and the foundation for greatly attenuated natural law duties. "Rights properl y speaking" derive only fro m the primacy of individual will.That is fro m Hobbes ; and everything descended fro m Hobbes , including Lock e and Kant. The y belong t o liberal modernit y ("the rational religion of the Enlightenment"). Hence , Kraynak asserts, Christian-Aristotelian natural rights are not "Vights ' properl y speaking." Her e the earlier inexactness has important consequences . Thes e premoder n Christian-Aristotelians speak of "natural rights" and "inalienable rights,"® and Hobbe s and Lock e still use this language although moving considerably in the direction of the primacy of individual will. It is only "human rights," an offshoot of Kantian "dignity," whic h is fully vulnerable t o Kraynak's objection. But if Kraynak is right that "rights properl y speaking" exist only within liberal modernity, that modernit y has no place for a Christian understanding of rights unless it is a Christianity that has gone over t o Enlightenment liberalism. T h e alternative for traditional Christians woul d be t o counte r liberal rights with the olde r Christian natural rights. Kraynak understands this t o be Maritain's project in distinguishing "personalist" fro m "bourgeois " democracy, and continued in Robert George' s "perfectionist liberalism" (Kraynak, 171). But he thinks this project gives insufficient weight t o "the self-love that is part of o u r fallen nature." Onc e grant "rights t o personal satisfaction and t o personal identity" and these rights "take over" and "swallo w up the higher ends and subvert higher authorities including the churches and theologians wh o defend them." Th e "mistake lies in vastly underestimating the subversive powe r of rights" (Kraynak, 171-72). This powerful argument describes much that w e see around us in late political modernity. Heideggerian nihilism, softened and liberalized by Dewey , etc., and the consequent invention of "civil liberties" by the I940's Supreme Court , intensified an individualism unmoderate d either by natural law o r by the right of legislatures t o limit individual choices as required by the commo n good . Gradually, even legislatures seem mor e interested in liberating individuals from , instead of reinforcing, previous duties. An d students com e t o my classes little conscious of their duties, but quite aware they have rights. So there is much t o be said for Kraynak's view that ou r fallen nature needs restraining as much as licensing. But there is also much t o be said for Christians not cutting themselves off from moder n public culture and for attempting t o moderat e that culture's wors t tendencies by teaching virtue in a language it can understand. Kraynak thinks this has vanishingly little hope of practical success; and he may be correct, at least for the reasonably foreseeable future.The recover y and teaching of the olde r Christian natural rights tradition may not save either democrac y o r Christianity from being subverted by extrem e notions of rights. GLENN 25 But, since w e cannot kno w the future, is it not ou r duty t o keep alive, as best w e can, the truth as it has been given t o us? An d t o hope that, at som e time, in ways unforeseeable by us, it might becom e effective? Such hope has precedents. Afte r the Founding, the natural rights teaching of the Declaration of Independence too k a back seat t o compromise s that permitted slavery t o expand, until Lincoln memorabl y re-energized its antislavery animus at Gettysburg. ^ An d although Las Casas failed t o save the Indians fro m the Conquistadores ' depredations , his intellectual efforts generated an example of the articulate rational grounds upon whic h later generations of Christians might defend those wh o d o not share ou r skin color, language o r faith; but wh o nevertheless deserve what belongs t o the m by nature.' ° Unde r present conditions it is understandable t o despair of wher e "rights " seem t o be taking us. But it is still possible t o defend the Christian - Aristotelian version rather than let autonom y based rights lead even Christians t o licentiousness o r despotism. "Th e founding document s of the Unite d States assert "certain 'self-evident' truths about the human person." Thes e are "opportunitie s in the pursuit of happiness and in service t o the commo n good;" a "freedo m designed t o enable people t o fulfill their duties and responsibilities towar d the family;" and a "respec t and support for the natural groupings through whic h people exist, develop, and seek the higher purposes of life in concert with others."" Rights can exist for the sake of man's moral duties as a membe r of society and not only as claims t o autonomy. This moderat e rights teaching, if I understand Kraynak correctly, was protected fro m corruptio n by ou r fallen nature's self-love because it was limited t o the purposes of fostering personal virtue and the commo n good . Ther e wer e never Christian natural rights against either of these. No r did Christian-Aristotelia n rights thinker s understand the commo n goo d as identical with what individuals choos e by way of seeking "personal satisfaction" o r "personal identity." Christian-Aristotelian rights wer e always conditional, and it is not clear wh y only unconditional rights should be said t o be "Vights ' properl y speaking." So the proble m is not rights as such, but those immoderat e extensions , by Kan t and others , of wha t rights are. Accordingly , rather than cease using rights language. Christians can deny that the natural rights language of the Declaration is wholl y modern . If it were , then t o affirm the Declaration on e must necessarily be a modern , a Hobbesian , a Lockean, and of a liberal religion whic h cares mor e about rights than about duties.To resist that, the philosopher Karo l Wojtil a points back t o the thought of Suarez, Vitoria , Las Casas and Bellarmine. Similarly, America n Catholic s of the past, especially Oreste s Brownso n and Archbisho p John Ireland, emphatically quoted Bellarmine and Suarez as evidence that Catholi c (and not only Lockean) understanding is reflected in the Declaration's inalienable rights teaching. 26 CATHOLIC SOCLVL SCIENCE REVIEW Abandonin g rights altogether means abandoning the Declaration and the political orde r founded o n it. So what is at stake here for traditional, dutyoriented Christians is whethe r they have a place in moder n democracy. Kraynak has written a powerful paragraph describing, at the level of specific public policies, wha t that means today. "Whil e pretending t o be neutral and open ended," liberalism "is dogmatic and hegemonic in its worldl y ambitions " and "promote s its vision of the Goo d Life with all the weapons of cultural hegemony and state power" (Kraynak, 223-34). To abandon all ideas of rights woul d both weaken ou r defenses against that and also confirm the old idea that the principles of democrac y are incompatible with Catholicism. I hope the seriousness with whic h I have taken Kraynak's argument adequately expresses my gratitude for this serious book . It is plainly the fruit of sacrificial love for his religion, his country, and the search for truth. Notes 1. Robert Kraynak, Christian Faith and Modern Democracy (Notr e Dame , IN: University of Notr e Dam e Press, 2001), 3. Subsequent references t o this wor k will be noted in the tex t with the following abbreviation: Kraynak. 2. Immanuel Kant, The Science of Right III, 22,25,28 . 3. Thoma s Hobbes , Leviathan Ch . 19, para. I; Ch . 26, para. 4. 4. Locke , Second Treatise of Civil Governmenu Ch . X , Sec. 132, para. I. 5. "Doctrinaire " is the application of theoretical principles t o practical situations withou t regard t o circumstances. Here , it is the view that there is only one legitimate practical application (democracy) of abstract principles (human rights). See the Oxfor d English Dictionary. 6. Robert Bellarmine (1542-1621) is also important in this tradition. Bellarmine and Suarez wer e held responsible by Filmer's Patriarcha (written before 1653, published 1680) for their "democratical" teaching of natural rights, government by consent of the governed, and right of revolution. Locke's First Treatise attacks Filmer and the Second Treatise famously propounds these ideas, o r at least these words . 7. A ter m Kan t coined. See J. B. Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridg e University Press, 1995). 8. See belo w and Arthu r R Monahan , From Personal Duties towards Personal Rights: Late Medieval and Early Modern Political Thought, 1300-1600 (Montreal: McGill - Queen s University Press, 1994). Ch.Three."Consen t and Limit in Spanish neoScholasticism." 128-84. 9. See Harr y V. Jaffa, A New Birth of Freedom: Abraham Lincoln and the coming of the Civil War (Lanham, Md. : Rowma n & Littlefield, 2000). 10. Bartolom e de Las Casas , In Defense of the Indians: The Defense of the Most Reverend Lord, Don Fray Bartolome de las Casas, of the Order of Preachers, late Bishop of Chiapa, Against the Persecutors and Slanderers of the Peoples of the New GLEN N 27 World Discovered Across the Seas, trans, and ed. Stafford Pool e (DeKal b Norther n Illinois Universit y Press, 1992). I I. Pope John Paul II, Decembe r 19, 1997. Speech welcomin g Lindy Boggs, nev U.S. ambassador t o the Hol y See.