The Overlooked "Peaks" of Morality: Kraynak argues that Seagrave focuses heavily on resolving the structural and theoretical compatibility between modern natural rights and classical natural law. By prioritizing this theoretical "arranged marriage," Seagrave neglects the telos (the end goal) or the "peaks" of human moral life. Kraynak contends that a true framework of natural morality must articulate what human moral excellence looks like and why it is inherently desirable
robert kraynaks critique of s. adam seagrave the foundation of natural morality
Robert P. Kraynak’s critique of S. Adam Seagrave’s book, The Foundations of Natural Morality: On the Compatibility of Natural Rights and the Natural Law, commends the book as an impressive, ingenious, and finely crafted achievement but offers a foundational philosophical challenge. Writing for the journal Perspectives on Politics, Kraynak centers his critique on the distinction between the "foundations" of morality vs. the "peaks" of morality. [1, 2]
The core elements of Kraynak's critique include:
- The Overlooked "Peaks" of Morality: Kraynak argues that Seagrave focuses heavily on resolving the structural and theoretical compatibility between modern natural rights and classical natural law. By prioritizing this theoretical "arranged marriage," Seagrave neglects the telos (the end goal) or the "peaks" of human moral life. Kraynak contends that a true framework of natural morality must articulate what human moral excellence looks like and why it is inherently desirable. [1, 2]
- The Problem of Motivation: According to Kraynak, establishing a logical baseline or "foundation" for rights and law is insufficient on its own. He points out that the "peaks" of morality—such as human perfection, virtue, and high moral character—are what actually give meaning, shape, and motivational force to the foundations. Without showing how natural morality actively contributes to the natural perfection of the human person, the framework lacks compelling power. [1]
- Distraction by Reconciling Strauss and Maritain: Seagrave spends considerable effort positioning his book between Leo Strauss (who argued rights and law are incompatible) and Jacques Maritain (who argued they are continuous). Kraynak suggests that this academic exercise, while intellectually rigorous, ironically distracts Seagrave from the more humanly urgent task: explaining and defending the very substance and nature of natural morality itself to a modern audience. [1, 2]
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