In this critique, Seagrave argues that John Finnis (and similarly, classical personalists like Jacques Maritain), in their eagerness to construct a modern framework for universal human rights rooted in traditional Thomistic natural law, "too easily dismiss the Hobbesian legacy of modern natural rights doctrines."The Core of the CritiqueThe "Hobbesian Legacy": Thomas Hobbes radically redefined the classical understanding of natural law. In classical philosophy (e.g., Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas), "law" or "right" (jus) was an objective moral order or what is due to others based on virtue and the common good. Hobbes inverted this by arguing that a "right" is essentially an individual, subjective, and pre-political power—primarily the unlimited liberty toward self-preservation
The quote you referenced originates from the work of political theorist S.A. Seagrave (specifically in his book The Foundations of Natural Morality), where he critically evaluates how modern natural law thinkers handle the historical shift in the concept of rights. [1, 2]
In this critique, Seagrave argues that John Finnis (and similarly, classical personalists like Jacques Maritain), in their eagerness to construct a modern framework for universal human rights rooted in traditional Thomistic natural law, "too easily dismiss the Hobbesian legacy of modern natural rights doctrines." [1, 2]
The Core of the Critique
- The "Hobbesian Legacy": Thomas Hobbes radically redefined the classical understanding of natural law. In classical philosophy (e.g., Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas), "law" or "right" (jus) was an objective moral order or what is due to others based on virtue and the common good. Hobbes inverted this by arguing that a "right" is essentially an individual, subjective, and pre-political power—primarily the unlimited liberty toward self-preservation. [1, 2, 3, 4]
- The Dismissal: Thinkers like John Finnis and Jacques Maritain attempt to argue that modern subjective "human rights" can seamlessly blend into the old classical-Christian natural law tradition without carrying the baggage of early modern individualism. [1]
- Seagrave's Point: Seagrave suggests that you cannot simply adopt the modern language of individual "rights" without reckoning with its origin story. By ignoring how deeply intertwined modern rights talk is with the Hobbesian emphasis on individual autonomy, self-interest, and power over an objective moral order, Finnis and Maritain overlook a fundamental conceptual tension. [1, 2, 3]
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