Is “Social Justice” Justice? A Thomistic Argument for “Social Persons” as the Proper Subjects of the Virtue of Social Justice Not surprisingly, this problem, residing at the core of the definition of social justice, has led to considerable confusion in its application. As Ernest Fortin put it: As nearly as I can make out, social justice, in contradistinction to either legal or distributive justice, does not refer to any special disposition of the soul and hence cannot properly be regarded as a virtue. Its subject is not the individual human being but a mysterious society named “X,” which is said to be unintentionally responsible for the condition of its members and in particular for the lot of the poor among them.3 Given that the popes seemed to envisage an important role for social justice in modern society, it would be beneficial if this definitional problem (and thus the subsequently “mysterious” applications) could be resolved.
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