Jeffrey C. Kalb, Jr. said... Mr. Given, I do agree, and I would add that Gilson, in his rush to assimilate Bergson's natural philosophy (in lieu of Aristotle's), also misunderstands St. Thomas's metaphysics. Gilson's is really a new metaphysics, perhaps inspired by St. Thomas, but diverging from it in many critical ways. To correct that misapprehension and return us to a more traditional interpretation was my essential interest in writing the short tract. Step one for me is to free St. Thomas from his modern shackles. My original background is materials science and electrical engineering. It was only as I began to see the problems with modern physics that I entered deeply into natural philosophy, and thence into metaphysics. I agree that in most respects Scotus and Aquinas are complementary. Bettoni was my first introduction to Scotism, and my reading of Scotus has extended only to my own philosophical interests. I certainly cannot be called an expert in his philosophy. However, I believe that his principal theses, understood in the proper sense, not in the sense Thomists assign to them, are compatible with a Thomistic framework. As a Catholic, I do not view Scotus as a suitable standard for the Church, given the smaller range of his thought, its abstruseness, and the confusing state of the writings he left behind. However, I think it very important that his new insights be incorporated into a Thomistic foundation. I too have sought a unifying viewpoint and I do believe I have found it in a discipline I call "Taxology," which I have spent the last 25 years developing. The study of pure metaphysical order effectively works as a material logic of the transcendentals. Its role is analogous to the role the mathematical apparatus plays in mathematical physics, except that I use the data of revelation and traditional metaphysics, rather than the data of the senses. The formal distinction, haecceity, and the univocity of being all find their taxological equivalents. If it is something that interests you, we can discuss it offline at the email I provided. It would take us far astray of this conversation.
Dr. Sullivan, I have read with interest your considerations on the differences between Thomistic and Scotistic metaphysics, and share your dislike of straw-man arguments against Scotus. I too find myself somewhere in between the two positions, but I have written a short metaphysical work to correct Etienne Gilson's misconstrual of the Thomistic tradition: "Existence and Subsistence in St. Aquinas: Against Gilsonian Metaphysics." Without adopting the position of any particular historical Thomist, I have shown that Gilsonian (née Bergsonian) anti-essentialism is based upon a faulty notion of essence. The book is priced (with almost no margin for the author) at $5.95. I would also be happy to send you a free copy and/or hear your opinions at jkalb3@cox.net
In Christ,
Jeff Kalb- James A. Given said...
Dear Dr. Kalb,
There is a long tradition of pointing out that Gilson fails to grasp the basis of Duns Scotus metaphysical position, some asserting that he interprets the meaning of Duns Scotus' claims in the way that Aquinas might have.I'm sure you are familiar with the history of commentaries of this kind
What I find to be of crucial importance in the relation of Scotism to Thomism is what seems to be a basic mutual incomprehension. As a theoretical physicist, it reminds me of complementarity, i.e., the relation between the "wave" picture and the "particle" picture of matter that students of physics must deal with.But unlike the situation in physics, there is no unified viewpoint that accommodates these distinct pictures of Being.
It is my forlorn ambition to find such a unifying viewpoint, not which combines these two very different pictures; but rather a larger more general viewpoint in which these two pictures can both be situated, perhaps as endpoints of a continuum.- Garrett said...
Wesley,
1. Right, so a divine idea is the 'creature as known', which contains a common nature and a haecceity.
2. on the scotist view, all divine simplicity requires is that one grant that every thing is 'realiter unum' in God. But formal distinction is compatible with real identity. the will is a divine attribute, and so could not not be in God, but it acts contingently regarding creation. it could have refrained from creating individuals or created different ones. such changes would be within the contingent will, and even if the act might be distinct from the will, all would be realiter unum in God. i don't think h owever, that natures could be otherwise than they are, that is, human being be constituted in a different way: natures are all thought up by the dvine intellect, which combines them based on the compatibilities inherent in the nature itself. So maybe, no goatstag.
James: i have not read the Doolan book, though i have seen his articles which look good. Scotus, of coourse, has a very differnet view of the ideas than Aquinas. And in light of univocity, he even at one point suggests that the divine intellect is quasi passive like ours.
Thanks for the book search engine. I have used it already. Not quite the home run on this particular book, though, since i live abroad shipping prices often make the cheap deal not so cheap in the end.- Wesley C. said...
@Garrett,
2) Interesting - so while the Will would be inseparable from God and necessarily exists, the contingent acts it does could have been different in some way?
The immediate objection that comes to mind is that this seems to violate Pure Actuality - if God's will is contingent and could have acted differently, wouldn't this imply some potentiality intrinsic to God's will in some sense? So a contingent act of will that could have been otherwise can't be attributed to God since it goes against PA?
Another possible objection is that if the contingent act of creation is itself realiter unum in God, then it's no longer contingent since nothing that is realiter unum with God could have been otherwise, so God's act of creation / decision of creating any particular thing is necessary.
Now one could avoid this by saying the act of creation isn't intrinsic to God or realiter unum with Him, but it also can't be an accident since this would go against divine simplicity, so it must be wholly extrinsic to God. But if the act of creation is wholly extrinsic then in what way can it even be attributed to God, since it is no longer attributed to Him properly as intrinsic? There would be no difference between this wholly-external model, and creation just popping into existence uncaused - it seems God is no longer responsible for creation's existence at all.
What do you think?- Jeffrey C. Kalb, Jr. said...
Mr. Given,
I do agree, and I would add that Gilson, in his rush to assimilate Bergson's natural philosophy (in lieu of Aristotle's), also misunderstands St. Thomas's metaphysics. Gilson's is really a new metaphysics, perhaps inspired by St. Thomas, but diverging from it in many critical ways. To correct that misapprehension and return us to a more traditional interpretation was my essential interest in writing the short tract. Step one for me is to free St. Thomas from his modern shackles.
My original background is materials science and electrical engineering. It was only as I began to see the problems with modern physics that I entered deeply into natural philosophy, and thence into metaphysics. I agree that in most respects Scotus and Aquinas are complementary. Bettoni was my first introduction to Scotism, and my reading of Scotus has extended only to my own philosophical interests. I certainly cannot be called an expert in his philosophy. However, I believe that his principal theses, understood in the proper sense, not in the sense Thomists assign to them, are compatible with a Thomistic framework. As a Catholic, I do not view Scotus as a suitable standard for the Church, given the smaller range of his thought, its abstruseness, and the confusing state of the writings he left behind. However, I think it very important that his new insights be incorporated into a Thomistic foundation.
I too have sought a unifying viewpoint and I do believe I have found it in a discipline I call "Taxology," which I have spent the last 25 years developing. The study of pure metaphysical order effectively works as a material logic of the transcendentals. Its role is analogous to the role the mathematical apparatus plays in mathematical physics, except that I use the data of revelation and traditional metaphysics, rather than the data of the senses. The formal distinction, haecceity, and the univocity of being all find their taxological equivalents. If it is something that interests you, we can discuss it offline at the email I provided. It would take us far astray of this conversation.- James A. Given said...
Wesley C:
I think you raise a very basic question that should appear as an exercise in a textbook on Western i.e., Christian metaphysics:
If God is omnipotent and can do all things, why is He not characterized by Infinite Potentiality rather than Infinite Actuality? Intuitively, a human e.g. is a higher form of being than a rock e.g. because the former has so many possibilities and capacities compared to the latter. And actualized capabilities seem often to multiple possibilities, not eliminate them.
Jeffrey Kalb:
I will email you. I have a similar story to yours. I am a professional physicist and engineer, and an amateur metaphysician.- Garrett said...
Wesley, I would say it does not violate divine simplicity because the divine potency in question is not a potency in being, such that the divine being is composed of potency and act, but rather active potency, which is the ability of a power to do something. divine simplicity only requires us to reject passive potency, the ability to be acted upon. even Aquinas incorporates the doctrine of active potency into his doctrine of creation. So I would qualify the notion of 'pure actuality' as an actuality of being.
As for the other objection, I would claim that formal distinction is compatible with everything in God being realiter unum. So the formally distinct intellect proposes a variety of essences and indivuduals to the will, and the will chooses to actualize them. How? I would say here with Scotus, that the will just wills, that is it's job. some things it wills necessarily, such as the divine nature, and others contingently, creation. the same sole divine power can have both aspects to its single act of will. In other words, I don't think I have an answer.- Garrett said...
Mr. Kalb, have you looked at any of the attempts to synthesize Scotus and abstract his ideas for a broader audience? I am thinking here of Antonius Andreas, who composed a commentary on the Metaphysics that had a literal section, taken from Aquinas' literal commentary, and a question commentary, which paraphrased Scotus' QQ on the Metaphysics.
- Wesley C. said...
@Garrett,
1) Couldn't one object that an ability's power to do something still implies potency, so the divine power would then have to be composed of act & potency? Or that the very concept of ability as we univocally understand it contains unactualised potentials with regards to its exercise?
2) I wasn't talking about the formal distinction being incompatible with realiter unum, but that if the act of creation itself is realiter unum in God, then it must be necessary and can't be contingent, so the divine Will can't have a contingent aspect internal to it since things that are realiter unum with God can't be different than what they are.
This seems to follow if we also assume that everything that is realiter unum in God can't be otherwise - so the distinct formalities in God can't be otherwise than how they actually are.- Wesley C. said...
On the other hand, a possible response could be that the Will is by nature self-determining, and with regards to finite creatable things logically cannot have a necessary relation towards them.
This is conceptually prior to considerations of pure actuality or whatnot, so the definition and nature of what will is may show us how its acts are contingent, or has a contingent element to it.
Furthermore, this doesn't need to conflict with God being Purely Actual since it's precisely God's infinite actuality that may allow for an abundance of freedom - His Will can have contingent aspects precisely by being rooted in pure actuality, which paradoxically implies freedom as infinite actuality opens up towards an infinite horizon of possible being, since the infinite maximally self-consistent God can't have a necessary relation to contingent finite reality. As Aquinas points out, the will is related to things in their ontology, so since contingent creation has contingent ontology, the Will can't be related to it necessarily.
What do you think of this?- James A. Given said...
The Desmond quote seems to claim him as another Existential Thomist, i.e., those that believe in the primacy of the experience of Being. Descartes essential reflection is replaced by an essential excitement:
Being ..... just ....... IS!
In either case, an essential subjective experience. This is Neoplatonist mysticism meeting Transcendental Thomism halfway-
My advice: Just Say No!- James A. Given said...
Garrett,
Is the commentary by Antonius Andreas available online? I find a CUA PhD thesis on this work (supervised by Timothy Noone) that looks quite interesting; but not the work itself-- Garrett said...
James: the Antonius is available in vol. 5 or 6 of the Vives edition of Scotus. It might be on the Logic museum website, but you can get the link to t he volume from Sidney penner's website. If you email me, I can send you an article or two about the text.
Not sure you are right about Desmond. He knows nothing at all about medieval, at least not when he wrote the present book. He seems to grant the need for univocity in science, but wants to avoid philosophy collapsing into math or physics. So he starts with the aristotelian experience, the desire to know,, but tries to intregrate univocal science with the equivocity of experience. It may end up as mysticism, though, who knows. I have only read the first two chapters.- James A. Given said...
Sorry to be presumptuous on Desmond. I have, but have not yet had occasion to read the book you mention. Your quote, with its ecstatic tones ("astonishment"), and use of the phrase "the question of being" caused me to anticipate the onset of "esse"-based mysticism. In re the unity of science with the rest of human experience, I recommend Michael Polanyi's Personal Knowledge.- RunDec said...
Can someone help me with a few questions about Scotus's arguments in "De Primo Principio"?
At one point Scotus is trying to prove that God is intelligent, and he offers this argument:
"4.21 There is a fifth proof for this conclusion, which is based on the fact that a living thing is better than anything not alive, and among living things what has understanding is better than what lacks intelligence."
However, at 4.22 Scotus presents an argument that intellect, love, etc., are pure perfections and therefore must be in God, etc. He then proceeds to refute that argument (I'm not convinced of his refutation, btw).
It seems to me like Scotus is contradicting himself here, unless I'm missing a subtle distinction he's making. He thinks we can prove God is intelligent from the fact that being intelligent is "better" than non-intelligent, but then seems to argue against that very kind of argument in the next paragraph.
I take "better" to refer to "more perfect", as in, possessing more actuality, more power, more irreducible properties. Yet isn't that what one also argues when speaking of pure perfections?- Jeffrey C. Kalb Jr. said...
@Garrett
I confess that I have not looked at these works. My current state in life does not give me the leisure to do that kind of research into secondary sources, so I will always be a bit out of the loop on current controversies. Truth be told, my primary interest is not really the synthesis of Aquinas and Scotus. For me, that is simply the outcome of the convertibility of being and order. I approach metaphysics in a very different way than either philosopher, though I interpret and regulate my speculation in terms of their theses.
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