Let us examine how Ernest Fortin critiques this specific development, as his critique of human rights hits at the very heart of the Locke-Rousseau-Kant transition. Fortin argues that the shift from Locke’s "natural property rights" to Kant’s "universal moral autonomy" represents a massive, unstable experiment in Western thought. By trying to fix the moral emptiness of Locke's system with Kant's historical idealism, modernity created a concept of "Human Rights" that is fundamentally detached from both nature and objective goodness. Fortin’s critique of this specific development unfolds across three major points: 1. The Lowly Origins: Locke's "Rights" as Self-Preservation Fortin reminds us that the modern concept of "rights" did not begin with lofty moral ideals. It began with Hobbes and Locke lowering the standards of classical-Christian natural law. • The Classical View: Natural law imposed duties on human beings to pursue virtue and the common good. • The Lockean Shift: Locke inverted this, making individual rights prior to duties. These rights were grounded in the low but reliable passions of self-preservation, physical security, and property ownership. • Fortin's Critique: Fortin points out that Locke’s rights are essentially selfish. They are claims the individual makes against society and others to protect their own private sphere. It is a rights-framework designed for the bourgeois. 2. The Rousseauian Crisis and the Kantian "Inflation" of Rights As we established, Rousseau was disgusted by Locke's selfish bourgeois society and demanded a return to virtue. Kant tried to fulfill this by upgrading Lockean rights into something noble: universal moral autonomy. Kant argued that a human right is not just a claim to protect your property; it is a sacred claim to be an autonomous, self-legislating moral agent. Fortin argues that this transition created a dangerous "inflation" of rights: • To rescue rights from Locke's vulgar materialism, Kant had to completely detach rights from human biology and physical nature. He grounded them purely in the abstract "will." • The Consequence: By defining freedom as absolute autonomy (literally, "self-legislating"), Kant implied that human beings are only truly free when they are completely independent of any external authority—including nature, tradition, or God. 3. The Modern Dilemma: Rights Without Duties Fortin’s most profound critique of the Locke-Kant transition is that it leaves modern society completely unequipped to foster genuine community. Because modern rights were born out of Locke's individualism and then hyper-charged by Kant's radical autonomy, they lack any intrinsic connection to objective human goodness or shared moral obligations. • In the Augustinian framework, human freedom is meaningful only when it is directed toward the Truth and the Good (loving God and neighbor). • In the modern Kantian framework, the absolute right to choose becomes more important than what is chosen. Fortin notes the tragic irony: modernity started by trusting Locke's commercial self-interest to build a stable state, realized it was morally bankrupt, and then used Kant's philosophy of history to promise that radical individual autonomy would somehow automatically produce a just, harmonious world. Instead, Fortin argues, it has left us with a hyper-legalistic society of atomized individuals weaponizing their "rights" against one another, completely lacking the shared virtues required to sustain a civilization.

Let us examine how Ernest Fortin critiques this specific development, as his critique of human rights hits at the very heart of the Locke-Rousseau-Kant transition.

Fortin argues that the shift from Locke’s "natural property rights" to Kant’s "universal moral autonomy" represents a massive, unstable experiment in Western thought. By trying to fix the moral emptiness of Locke's system with Kant's historical idealism, modernity created a concept of "Human Rights" that is fundamentally detached from both nature and objective goodness.

Fortin’s critique of this specific development unfolds across three major points:

1. The Lowly Origins: Locke's "Rights" as Self-Preservation

Fortin reminds us that the modern concept of "rights" did not begin with lofty moral ideals. It began with Hobbes and Locke lowering the standards of classical-Christian natural law.

• The Classical View: Natural law imposed duties on human beings to pursue virtue and the common good.
• The Lockean Shift: Locke inverted this, making individual rights prior to duties. These rights were grounded in the low but reliable passions of self-preservation, physical security, and property ownership.
• Fortin's Critique: Fortin points out that Locke’s rights are essentially selfish. They are claims the individual makes against society and others to protect their own private sphere. It is a rights-framework designed for the bourgeois.

2. The Rousseauian Crisis and the Kantian "Inflation" of Rights

As we established, Rousseau was disgusted by Locke's selfish bourgeois society and demanded a return to virtue. Kant tried to fulfill this by upgrading Lockean rights into something noble: universal moral autonomy. Kant argued that a human right is not just a claim to protect your property; it is a sacred claim to be an autonomous, self-legislating moral agent.

Fortin argues that this transition created a dangerous "inflation" of rights:

• To rescue rights from Locke's vulgar materialism, Kant had to completely detach rights from human biology and physical nature. He grounded them purely in the abstract "will."
• The Consequence: By defining freedom as absolute autonomy (literally, "self-legislating"), Kant implied that human beings are only truly free when they are completely independent of any external authority—including nature, tradition, or God.

3. The Modern Dilemma: Rights Without Duties

Fortin’s most profound critique of the Locke-Kant transition is that it leaves modern society completely unequipped to foster genuine community.

Because modern rights were born out of Locke's individualism and then hyper-charged by Kant's radical autonomy, they lack any intrinsic connection to objective human goodness or shared moral obligations.

• In the Augustinian framework, human freedom is meaningful only when it is directed toward the Truth and the Good (loving God and neighbor).
• In the modern Kantian framework, the absolute right to choose becomes more important than what is chosen.

Fortin notes the tragic irony: modernity started by trusting Locke's commercial self-interest to build a stable state, realized it was morally bankrupt, and then used Kant's philosophy of history to promise that radical individual autonomy would somehow automatically produce a just, harmonious world. Instead, Fortin argues, it has left us with a hyper-legalistic society of atomized individuals weaponizing their "rights" against one another, completely lacking the shared virtues required to sustain a civilization.