That qualification means that my earlier connection between Wilhelmsen’s philosophy and modern rights theories was an application of his broader philosophical approach, not a verified statement of his specific position on every rights theory. The distinction matters for three reasons: 1. Wilhelmsen’s metaphysics: His Gilsonian Thomism emphasizes esse, the act of existence, and the intelligibility of being. 2. His political philosophy: His account of political authority and the common good must be examined in its own terms, rather than inferred entirely from his metaphysics. 3. Modern rights theories: Whether rights are grounded in human nature, natural law, individual autonomy, or political convention is a further question requiring direct textual evidence. Given your interest in Michel Villey, John Rist, and the classical understanding of justice, the important question is whether Wilhelmsen treats rights as claims grounded in an objective moral order or accepts elements of modern subjective-rights theory. I would not attribute either position to him without examining the relevant passages of Christianity and Political Philosophy. If we pursue this question, the most useful comparison would be Wilhelmsen alongside Villey: does Wilhelmsen's metaphysics lead to a conception of justice centered on objective right and the common good, or does he give a more prominent role to subjective rights?
That qualification means that my earlier connection between Wilhelmsen’s philosophy and modern rights theories was an application of his broader philosophical approach, not a verified statement of his specific position on every rights theory.
The distinction matters for three reasons:
Wilhelmsen’s metaphysics: His Gilsonian Thomism emphasizes esse, the act of existence, and the intelligibility of being.
His political philosophy: His account of political authority and the common good must be examined in its own terms, rather than inferred entirely from his metaphysics.
Modern rights theories: Whether rights are grounded in human nature, natural law, individual autonomy, or political convention is a further question requiring direct textual evidence.
Given your interest in Michel Villey, John Rist, and the classical understanding of justice, the important question is whether Wilhelmsen treats rights as claims grounded in an objective moral order or accepts elements of modern subjective-rights theory.
I would not attribute either position to him without examining the relevant passages of Christianity and Political Philosophy.
If we pursue this question, the most useful comparison would be Wilhelmsen alongside Villey: does Wilhelmsen's metaphysics lead to a conception of justice centered on objective right and the common good, or does he give a more prominent role to subjective rights?
In Wilhelmsen’s Christianity and Political Philosophy, the distinction between judgments of fact and judgments of value is best approached through his larger argument: political philosophy cannot be separated from metaphysical questions about reality, human nature, good and evil, and the grounds of political authority.
1. The central distinction
Consider three statements:
Judgment of fact: A government has enacted a law permitting a particular practice.
Judgment of value: That law is just or unjust.
Philosophical judgment: What makes a law just in the first place? Is justice merely what a society chooses, or does it have an objective foundation in human nature and the good?
The first statement describes what is. The second evaluates it. The third asks what makes the evaluation true or false.
For Wilhelmsen, political philosophy must address the third question rather than stopping at empirical facts or treating political values as mere preferences.
2. Why Christianity matters to political judgment
Wilhelmsen argues that Christian revelation can open up philosophical questions and deepen our understanding of political realities. His discussion of natural law, political authority, and the relationship between Christianity and the American political tradition illustrates this approach.
The reasoning is roughly as follows:
Political institutions are real human institutions, not merely collections of subjective opinions.
Human beings possess a nature and live within an objective moral order.
Political judgments therefore require an account of justice, authority, and the human good.
Christianity illuminates these questions by placing human nature and political life within a larger understanding of creation, sin, moral responsibility, and humanity's ultimate end.
This does not mean that every political question can be answered by simply quoting Scripture. Wilhelmsen's approach allows philosophical reasoning to investigate political questions while recognizing that Christian faith can disclose truths that transform the questions philosophy asks.
3. The danger of treating values as subjective
Suppose two governments adopt contradictory policies. One policy respects a genuine human good; the other undermines it.
If value judgments are merely expressions of preference, we lack an objective standard for deciding between them. We can report what each government does and what its citizens believe, but we cannot establish which policy is just.
An objective political philosophy, by contrast, asks whether each policy conforms to justice and the good of human beings.
This is particularly relevant to Wilhelmsen's emphasis on the relationship between political authority and the moral order. Political power does not establish its own ultimate justification simply by possessing the ability to command.
4. How this connects to your broader philosophical interests
The important distinction is between discovering moral truth and creating moral truth.
Wilhelmsen's approach is consistent with the classical natural-law tradition: reason seeks to understand an order it did not invent. Political authority must be understood in relation to that order, rather than assuming that whatever a sovereign or majority decides becomes just by virtue of the decision.
This also raises a question about modern rights theories: are rights grounded in objective human goods and duties, or are they treated as claims whose validity rests primarily on individual choice or political recognition?
That question is a useful extension of Wilhelmsen's approach, although it should not be mistaken for a complete summary of his position on every modern rights theory.
One qualification: I have verified the book's overall argument and chapter topics, but not a specific passage in which Wilhelmsen directly formulates the distinction between judgments of fact and judgments of value. The explanation above is a synthesis of his broader philosophy, not a quotation or a claim that he uses those exact terms in a particular chapter.
You can consult the publisher's description and table of contents here: Christianity and Political Philosophy — Routledge.
Not necessarily. Wilhelmsen’s argument should not automatically be read as a critique of Dietrich von Hildebrand. There is a potential philosophical tension, but we need to distinguish Hildebrand’s actual theory of value from the subjectivism that Wilhelmsen’s approach might challenge.
1. Hildebrand does not treat values as subjective preferences
For Dietrich von Hildebrand, values are objective: something can possess importance in itself, independently of whether we happen to desire it or find it useful.
For example, justice is not good merely because a society approves of it. It merits an appropriate response because of its intrinsic value. Hildebrand calls the fitting response to a value a value-response.
That is a crucial point: Hildebrand is not arguing that value judgments are merely personal opinions.
2. Where a tension with Wilhelmsen might arise
Wilhelmsen's Christianity and Political Philosophy addresses the metaphysical foundations of political life, natural law, political authority, and Christianity's relationship to philosophy.
We can distinguish three positions:
Position | Central claim |
|---|---|
Subjectivism | Values depend on individual preferences or feelings. |
Hildebrand's value philosophy | Values are objective and call for appropriate responses. |
Classical metaphysical approach | Goodness and value must be understood in relation to being, human nature, and the ultimate order of reality. |
Hildebrand's position is much closer to the latter two than to subjectivism.
The possible disagreement concerns the philosophical explanation of objective value. A Thomistic critic might ask whether Hildebrand's phenomenological account sufficiently explains how values are grounded in being and the objective good. Hildebrand, however, does not simply ignore metaphysics or God; his ethical philosophy explicitly addresses the relationship between moral goodness, God, and humanity's destiny.
3. The important distinction: value judgments versus judgments of fact
Suppose someone says:
Fact: A political law permits a certain action.
Value judgment: The action is unjust.
Metaphysical question: What makes the action unjust, and what grounds the standard by which we judge it?
Hildebrand would not deny the distinction between the first two. His philosophy is concerned precisely with how we recognize objective values and respond to them appropriately.
Wilhelmsen's broader political philosophy raises the additional question of how metaphysics and Christian truth inform political judgment. That concern does not, by itself, contradict Hildebrand.
My conclusion
I would not characterize Christianity and Political Philosophy as a direct critique of Hildebrand without a specific passage establishing that connection. The more defensible question is whether Hildebrand's phenomenological account of objective values is fully compatible with Wilhelmsen's metaphysical and Christian account of political order.
That is a substantive philosophical question, but the existence of objective values is not the point on which these thinkers can simply be assumed to disagree.
Jeffrey C. Kalb Jr.’s critique of Étienne Gilson’s influence is relevant to understanding Frederick D. Wilhelmsen, because Wilhelmsen was strongly influenced by Gilson’s interpretation of St. Thomas Aquinas. A memoir of Wilhelmsen explicitly describes his strong preference for Gilson’s interpretations, while emphasizing that Wilhelmsen was an independent thinker rather than merely a disciple.
The central issue is whether Gilson’s existential Thomism adequately explains the relationship between being, becoming, knowledge, and objective reality. Kalb’s criticism appears to challenge important assumptions in Gilson’s philosophical framework, but we need to distinguish Kalb’s documented criticisms of Gilson from any direct criticism he may have made of Wilhelmsen.
1. Kalb’s likely objection: existential Thomism and the priority of becoming
Jeffrey C. Kalb’s broader philosophical project challenges modern assumptions about mathematics, nature, and knowledge. His book Music and Measurement argues that modern mathematical thinking rests on problematic assumptions about number, quantity, and measurement. A discussion reproduced by The Catholic Monitor also records Kalb’s interlocutor proposing that Gilson’s influence helped introduce problematic assumptions into Catholic philosophy; Kalb responds favorably to the broader direction of the critique.
However, I have not located a sufficiently clear primary text establishing Kalb’s complete critique of Wilhelmsen himself. The following is therefore a reconstruction of the philosophical issue, not a verified account of every claim Kalb makes.
2. What Wilhelmsen inherits from Gilson
Wilhelmsen’s existential Thomism emphasizes esse: the act of existing by which a thing actually is. His book Being and Knowing argues that existence is known through intellectual judgment, rather than by treating existence as simply another object observed by the senses.
His approach can be summarized as follows:
Essence: what a thing is.
Existence (esse): the act by which the thing actually exists.
Judgment: the intellectual act through which we affirm that something is.
This is intended to defend the reality of existing things against philosophies that reduce reality to concepts or mental constructions.
3. Where Kalb’s criticism could become important
The crucial question is whether Gilson and Wilhelmsen adequately preserve the intelligible forms and stable natures of things while emphasizing existence.
Kalb’s wider concerns suggest three possible lines of criticism:
Philosophical issue | Question for Wilhelmsen’s existential Thomism |
|---|---|
Being and becoming | Does the account preserve the enduring identity of things through change? |
Essence and intelligibility | Does it adequately explain how the intellect knows the stable nature of a thing? |
Mathematical abstraction | Does modern thought mistake an abstract, measurable representation for reality itself? |
The third issue is especially relevant to Kalb’s work on number and measurement. But it would be inaccurate to conclude, without further textual evidence, that he rejects Wilhelmsen’s entire metaphysics of esse.
4. The deeper connection to your question about value judgments
This debate could matter for value philosophy, including Hildebrand’s.
If reality possesses intelligible natures and objective ends, then judgments about goodness and justice need not be reduced to subjective preference. Yet the question remains how objective value is grounded in being and how the intellect recognizes it.
Wilhelmsen’s emphasis on existence does not itself entail subjectivism. Nor does Kalb’s criticism of Gilson establish that Wilhelmsen’s account of political or moral value is mistaken.
The key distinction: a critique of Gilson’s interpretation of Aquinas is not automatically a critique of Aquinas, and a critique of Wilhelmsen’s metaphysics would not automatically refute his political philosophy.
If you have the particular Kalb passage or article in mind, I can examine his actual argument against Wilhelmsen’s Gilsonian leanings rather than attribute a reconstructed criticism to him.
Comments